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 Chapter 1 examines the relevance of operations based variables predicting future 
earnings. We use United States Air Transportation (airline) industry data to identify 
operations based variables that provide predictive information beyond that found in 
earnings components. We show that the adjusted R-squared from accounting based 
prediction models can be increased up to 5.1 percentage points by including operations 
based variables. We also find that predictive information found in operations based 
variables is not fully impounded in financial analysts’ earnings predictions. We show that 
operations based variables explain 7.7 percentage points of analyst forecast error. We 
observe that this effect is especially large after the terroristic attacks of September 11, 
2001 suggesting analysts continued using historical prediction methods, even though the 
airline industry went through dramatic turmoil. 
 Chapter 2 examines determinants of sticky cost behavior (asymmetric cost 
changes as revenue fluctuates). Cost accounting researchers examine sticky cost behavior 
to gain insights about management capacity decisions. The majority of the extant 
literature infers that costs decrease slower than they increase with demand fluctuations 
because management retains unused capacity in anticipation of future demand 
 iv 
resurgence. I use airline industry data to provide evidence that sticky costs are associated 
with capacity and output selling price changes as management matches capacity with 
sales volume. I conclude that sticky costs arise when management adjusts capacity and 
sales volume (through pricing) if marginal cost of adding capacity is increasing as 
demand grows and marginal benefit from reducing capacity is decreasing as demand 
falls. 
 There is a lack of research investigating sources of credibility in nonfinancial 
disclosures. This is likely due to difficulty in associating expected future performance 
with nonfinancial variables. Chapter 3 addresses the problem using customer retention 
strategy disclosures. Customer retention theory provides expectations regarding 
economic outcome which can be used to validate sources of credibility in nonfinancial 
disclosure. I find that firms that provide verifiable detail in their customer retention 
disclosure increase the persistence of positive abnormal performance relative to firms that 
do not. This result contributes by providing evidence that verifiable detail is a valid 
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 My dissertation is a compilation of three stand-alone papers. The first paper 
(Chapter 1), co-authored with Taylor Randall and Christian Terwiesch, examines the 
predictive associations between operations based variables and future earnings using data 
from the United States Air Transportation industry. We find that some of the predictive 
information conveyed by operations based variables is incremental to that conveyed by 
earnings components. We also find that financial analysts do not fully impound the 
information provided by operations based variables. Finally, we observe that this effect is 
especially prevalent following the terroristic attacks of September 11, 2001. 
 The second paper (Chapter 2) uses United States Air Transportation industry data 
to identify determinants of sticky cost behavior (asymmetric cost changes as revenue 
increases and decreases). I provide evidence that sticky costs arise when managers incur 
increasing marginal cost and decreasing marginal benefit as they adjust capacity. I also 
provide evidence that sticky costs arise when managers adjust sales volume through 
output selling price changes. These determinants add to the prevalent explanation offered 
by the extant literature that sticky costs arise from managers’ retention of unused 




 The third paper (Chapter 3) identifies verifiable detail as a valid source of 
credibility in nonfinancial strategy disclosure. Specifically, I use customer retention 
theory to form expectations regarding outcome associated with credible customer 
retention strategy disclosure. I find that ex post outcome of firms that provide verifiable 
detail in their disclosures is more consistent with theory than outcome of firms that do 
not. This result provides evidence that verifiable detail is a valid source of credibility in 









EVALUATING OPERATIONS BASED DATA IN EARNINGS 
PREDICTION: A STUDY OF THE UNITED STATES 
AIRLINE INDUSTRY 
 
 The prediction of future earnings is one of the most important tasks for investors 
in publicly traded companies. Firm valuation and the stock price of a company are 
determined based on future expected earnings (e.g., Copeland, Koller, McKinsey and 
Company & Murrin, 2000; Ohlson, 1995). Sophisticated investors spend a significant 
amount of resources building statistical models to predict future earnings for a specific 
company (Lundholm & Sloan, 2004). Earnings prediction models used by professional 
investors are typically built for a specific industry and often make extensive use of 
operations based variables. For example, the Standard and Poor’s guide (2005) on how to 
analyze an airline includes 10 pages explaining various operational details specific to the 
airline industry. However, academic research investigating the predictive qualities and 





& Bushee, 1997). Our research objective is to investigate if operations based variables 
can help in the prediction of future earnings and to analyze to what extent operations 
based variables are used by professional analysts in their creation of earnings predictions. 
While the earnings component variables discussed in the accounting literature are 
universally applicable across a broad range of industries, this is not the case for 
operations based variables. It lies in the nature of operations based variables that they are 
industry specific. Hence, to make the case that operations based variables carry predictive 
power, we have to pick a specific industry for our empirical analysis. We found that the 
United States Air Transportation (airline) industry provides an interesting research setting 
given our research objective. Due to regulation, the industry provides a detailed set of 
well-defined operations based variables that are publicly available and can be compared 
across airlines and over a long time horizon. Moreover, the industry is predominantly 
comprised of publicly traded firms which have experienced substantial variation in 
performance. 
In the context of the airline industry, we empirically analyze the relationship 
between a set of operations based variables, earnings predictions made by professional 
analysts, and realized financial performance. This allows us make the following three 
contributions. 
First, we show that operations based variables significantly increase the 
predictive power of earnings prediction models beyond that provided by accounting 




traditional accounting models can be increased by 5.1 percentage points, from 71.2% to 
76.3% with the inclusion of operations based variables. This extends prior research in 
Operations Management that has established a link between operations based variables 
and contemporary (same period) financial performance (see Lapre & Tsikriktis, 2006 and 
Tsikriktsis, 2007 as examples) by showing that operations based variables can also serve 
as predictors of future financial performance. 
Second, we show that the predictive information found in these operations based 
variables is not fully impounded in analyst forecasts. When looking over the entire time 
period from 1993 to 2007 we find that these operations based variables explain up to an 
additional 7.8 percentage points, from 31.0% to 38.8%, of consensus analyst forecast 
error beyond earnings components, year, quarter and firm effects alone. This extends 
prior accounting research that has examined analyst forecast error (Abarbanell, 1991; 
Abarbanell & Bushee, 1997; O’Brien, 1988) by demonstrating that analysts do not fully 
incorporate relevant operational information in their forecasts. 
Third, we examine the impact of the terroristic attacks of September 11, 2001 
and the subsequent turmoil in the airline industry on both the predictive power and the 
analysts’ use of operations based variables. We show that operations based variables do 
not predict analyst forecast error in the years prior to September 11, 2011 but do predict 
analyst forecast error afterwards. This suggests that the financial value drivers in the 
airline industry changed as a result of the turmoil and analysts could have improved their 
forecast accuracy by looking at operational variables instead of relying on the prediction 
methods that had been developed and calibrated under very different industry conditions. 




 review of the relevant literature. Section 1.3 develops the theory and econometric 
framework for identifying relationships between operations based variables and future 
earnings. Section 1.3 also includes a discussion of the relationship between information 
and analyst forecast error. Section 1.4 describes how our theory and methods are applied 
in the airline industry. Section 1.5 discusses results and analysis. Finally, Section 1.6 
provides a conclusion and future research direction. 
 
Several studies in Operations Management have analyzed the relationship 
between operations based variables and contemporary financial performance. 
Interestingly, most of these studies have been conducted in the airline industry, including 
Haunschild and Sullivan (2002); Lapre and Scudder (2004); Luo (2007); Rothstein 
(1971); Subramanian, Stidham and Lautenbacher (1999); You (1999); and Zhao and 
Zheng (2001). Tsikriktsis (2007) provides the most recent work in this area, investigating 
the contemporary association between operational efficiency and earnings (e.g., the effect 
of fleet utilization in period t on earnings in period t). This line of work endows us with 
econometric models of the relationship between operations based variables and 
accounting variables. Specifically, we use the variables defined by Lapre and Scudder 
(2004) as the foundation for constructing our set of operations-based variables. 
Prior Literature 
The central difference between our work and prior studies in Operations 
Management is that we do not use operations based variables to explain contemporary 
(same period) financial performance but instead use operations based variables to predict 




might look similar to prior empirical studies of airline operations, yet our theoretical 
approach (and consequently our econometric models) is rather different. 
Earnings prediction models in the Accounting literature establish a correlation 
between contemporary accounting and future earnings information (e.g., the effect of 
margins in period t on earnings in period t+1). For example, it has been well-documented 
that stock prices contain leading information about future earnings (Beaver, Lambert, & 
Morse, 1980, Beaver, Lambert, & Ryan, 1987; Collins, Kothari, & Rayburn, 1987; 
Freeman, 1987). Additionally, Beaver and Morse (1978) show that price/earnings ratios 
have predictive quality with respect to future earnings. The relationship between current 
earnings and firm value (commonly considered a function of expected future earnings, 
Feltham & Ohlson, 1995) has been referred to as an earnings capitalization multiplier or 
earnings response coefficient. Early research (Easton & Zmijewski, 1989 and Kormendi 
& Lipe, 1987) characterizes earnings response coefficients as firm-specific parameters 
that describe a stream of future earnings implicit in current earnings. 
Later research (Penman, 1992) shows that earnings response coefficients are not 
fixed, but variable over time. Therefore, earnings response coefficients do not effectively 
represent future earnings streams because they may only be calculated ex-post. Ou and 
Penman (1989) utilize a statistical approach to reduce 68 prior and contemporaneous 
accounting measures to 28 that are significant in calculating earnings response 
coefficients. Fairfield, Sweeney and Yohn (1996) investigate the incremental information 
content found through disaggregation of accounting earnings. They find that 
disaggregation provides incremental explanatory power in explaining variance in future 




they find that forecast errors decrease with disaggregation. Disaggregation also is the 
central idea behind the studies of Banker and Johnston (1993) and Ittner and Larcker 
(1998). Both of these studies use nonfinancial data to explain earnings. Banker and 
Johnston (1993) use the airline industry to demonstrate the importance of operations 
based variables as cost drivers. Ittner and Larcker (1998) demonstrate the importance of 
customer satisfaction as a driver of various firm level performance measures ranging 
from new customer acquisition to earnings. 
In addition to predicting future earnings, accounting research has also analyzed 
the information content of analyst forecasts. Brown, Hagerman, Griffin and Zmijewski 
(1987) find that analyst forecasts are more accurate than time-series earnings models in 
predicting quarterly earnings both due to timing and better utilization of available 
information. Lang and Lundholm (1996) show that analysts perform the role of an 
information intermediary by processing and interpreting firm-disclosed information. 
O’Brien (1988) finds a systematic bias in analyst forecasts. Abarbanell (1991) finds that 
analyst forecasts generally reflect analyst optimism (forecasts that are too high) and that 
analysts appear to conservatively (partially) adjust their forecasts for changes in stock 
price. Lundholm and McVay (2006) develop a forecasting model using store growth in 
the retail industry that performs better than analyst forecasts. Finally, most similar to our 
results, Abarbanell (1991) and Abarbanell and Bushee (1997) find several accounting and 
efficiency variables (stock price, inventory, gross margin, earnings quality, labor force 
efficiency) are correlated with analyst forecast errors. 
Closest to our study is the work by Gaur, Fisher and Raman (2005) and Luo 




and firm value in the retail sector. Similarly, Luo studies the association between 
consumer complaints and firm value in the airline industry. Since firm value is based on 
expected future earnings (Feltham & Ohlson, 1995), this work can conceptually be 
thought of as an earnings prediction model based on operational data. Our work, like the 
studies by Gaur et al. (2005) and Luo (2007), is at the interface between Operations 
Management and Accounting. Yet, it is unique in the level of detail in the definition of 
operational variables, which goes well beyond what is reported in financial statements, 
and our analysis of how analysts use such operational data when creating earnings 
predictions. 
 
Our objective is to predict future (period t) earnings based on any currently (up to 
period t-1) available information. Let 
Theory Development 
tEˆ  represent the predicted earnings for period t and 
let Informationt-1 represent all information available in the prior period. Our objective is 
to create a predictive model: 
 
( )1ˆ −= tt nInformatiofE                                               (1.1) 
 
We can distinguish between two types of prediction models depending on the type 
of variables included in Informationt-1. First, an earnings components model uses 
information about last period’s earnings to forecast subsequent earnings. Earnings 
components models have been extensively used in the Accounting literature (Abarbanell 




Penman, 1989). This line of literature suggests disaggregating earnings into operating and 




−− ++= ttt NonopIncOpIncE ααα                                   (1.2) 
 
where OpInct-1 and NonopInct-1 represent actual operating and nonoperating earnings at 
time t-1 and the coefficients capture the degree of earnings persistency. Similarly, we can 
predict a change in earnings in a particular quarter relative to the same quarter 12 months 
ago based on information how the previous quarter changed relative to the quarter that 




−− ∆+∆+=∆ ttt NonopIncOpIncE ηηη                                (1.3) 
 
where the Δxt represents the difference between the value of a variable x in period t and 
the value of x in the same quarter 1 year ago. 
 Beyond the earnings components model, we can introduce a set of operations 
based variables to supplement equations 1.2 and 1.3. Such operations based prediction 
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 To empirically assess the explanatory power of operations variables relative to 
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 In order to demonstrate that operations based variables have predictive power 
beyond what is captured in accounting variables, we need to demonstrate that the 
variables in OV (ΔOV) collectively increase the explanatory power of the regression 
model. Thus, our hypothesis test is based on demonstrating that the change in R-squared 
from the regression model without the variables contained in OV to the regression model 
that includes the variables in OV is statistically different (larger than) zero. 
 Next, consider the relationship between operations based variables and analyst 
forecasts. Analyzing historical forecasts and the associated forecast errors reveals insights 
about the information used in the underlying forecasting process. The relationship 
between earnings forecasts, information and future earnings can be written as: 
 
ttt FEAFE +=                                                     (1.8) 
 




error at period t. The forecast error can take on positive or negative values. 
 A systematic bias unassociated with the prediction model will manifest itself in 
systematic forecast error. For example, optimism (systematically high analyst forecasts) 
will manifest itself in low (negative) forecast errors (Abarbanell, 1991). Although we 
recognize and allow our model to capture (as an intercept) systematic analyst bias that is 
unrelated to information, this is not the main focus of our work. Instead, our goal is to 
show that some of the variance in the realized values of forecast errors can be explained 
using operations based variables. 
 The following regression model represents an econometric specification that 
allows us to assess the incremental explanatory power of operations based variables when 
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The above equations are to be estimated taking into account temporal and firm effects 
(omitted from the equations for exposition). Just as in the case of earnings prediction 
models, an increase in the explanatory power brought along by the operations based 







Our sample is comprised of quarterly observations taken from nine airlines across 
15 years. Our sample includes American Airlines, Delta Airlines, United Airlines, 
America West Airlines, Southwest Airlines, US Airways, Continental Airlines, 
Northwest Airlines and Alaska Airlines. Some airlines, most notably Southwest, have 
flourished while most (American, Delta, United, America West, US Airways, Continental 
and Northwest) have struggled repeatedly and have seen more losses than profits over the 
period of our study. 
Industry Background and Implementation 
Northwest Airlines does not have financial data available in 1993-1994 and US 
Airways and America West Airlines merge effective the third quarter of 2005. These 
missing airline-quarters, together with 1 lagged quarter, leave an initial sample size of 
512 airline-quarters.  In this initial sample, we identified 18 outliers. These observations 
repeatedly showed up as outliers across regression models (studentized residuals less than 
-3 and greater than 3) and so we conducted a detailed, case-by-case analysis for each of 
them. As a result of this case-by-case analysis, we removed three outliers associated with 
bankruptcy-related extraordinary items in quarters Q405, Q106 and Q107 for Delta 
Airlines and one outlier associated with anomalous extraordinary operating items for 
United in Q103. Additionally, we removed seven outliers associated with anomalous 
changes in nonoperating expense (five outliers associated with anomalous changes in 
nonoperating expense in Northwest Airlines in quarters Q305 through Q206 and Q107 
and two outliers associated with an anomalous change in nonoperating expense in 




associated with changes from large tax credits to no tax expense/credit due to abnormally 
large net deferred tax assets for United Airlines and American Airlines (Q402). We 
retained five additional outliers that represent significant changes in operating 
performance with no evidence of anomalous accounting issues. This led to a sample of 
499 usable earnings prediction observations. Eighty-five of these observations are 
missing analyst forecasts (constrained by available information timing), leaving 414 
usable forecast error observations. 
We computed all accounting variables using quarterly United States Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings. In addition, we computed our operations based 
variables using information from quarterly SEC filings, the monthly Air Travel 
Consumer Report (ATCR) issued by the United States Department of Transportation and 
the Transtats database offered by the Bureau of Transportation Services. 
 Consistent with prior forecast error research (Brown, Foster & Noreen, 1984; 
Elton, Gruber & Gultekin, 1981; O’Brien, 1988), we used IBES consensus median 
forecast errors.1
 The earnings components models (equations 1.3 and 1.4) parse net income into 
operating and nonoperating income due to differential persistence (Fairfield et al., 1996). 
The operations models (equations 1.5 and 1.6) supplement earnings components with 
 Specifically, we used forecasts issued after the SEC filing and ATCR are 
released for prior quarter results (see Figure 1.1). 
 
                                                 
1 We repeat all our analysis (unreported) using mean forecast errors and find (consistent with O’Brien, 
1988) a larger degree of bias and forecast error. We also reconcile quarterly net income to match IBES-
reported net earnings to ensure comparability between IBES analyst forecasts and net income. Additionally, 
IBES analyst forecasts and net earnings are typically adjusted for nonrecurring items. This adjusts for 











Timeline of Events 
 
operations based variables.2
 The first two operations based variables, aircraft load factor (the percentage of 
seat miles that an airline obtains revenues for, RPM/ASM) and airtime, measure the 
aircraft efficiency. Efficiency (also called utilization and productivity) has been 
positively associated with contemporaneous earnings (Lapre & Scudder, 2004; 
Tsikriktsis, 2007). Similarly, we expect changes in efficiency to be positively associated 
with changes in future earnings. 
 
 The airline industry provides several measures of service quality including 
consumer complaints, on-time arrival performance, involuntary denied boarding and 
mishandled baggage.3,4
                                                 
2 The functional form for the earnings component model is based on a simple random walk. In contrast, the 
exact functional form for the operations model is not theoretically specified and is assumed to be linear. We 
ran various time-horizon moving average operations based variable models as well. The specific results 
differ slightly from model to model. However, our conclusions that 1) operations based variables provide 
predictive power and 2) the variables that matter change with the 9/11 industry shock remain robust. 
 Service quality has a rich history of positive association with firm 
performance (Ittner & Larcker, 1998; Luo, 2007; Tsikriktsis, 2007). Some of the positive 
3 We recognize that there are limitations to using on-time arrival performance as a measure of service 
quality. For example, we make an implicit assumption about passengers’ ex ante expectations (that a flight 
will arrive on-time), we introduce noise associated with exogenous seasonal factors such as weather 
(partially captured by our temporal control variables), we submit ourselves to potential self-report bias, and 
Analyst
Forecastst
Earnings SEC Filing/          Earnings




benefits come after adverse performance due to initial cost outlays (Lapre & Scudder, 
2004). Similarly, we expect that changes in service quality will have a positive 
association with changes in future earnings. 
 We use on-time arrival performance as a measure of service quality as it is 
available by flight and booking airline. This becomes increasingly important over the 
sample period as major airlines provide an increasing number of flights through regional 
subsidiaries and/or engage in capacity purchase agreements with independent regional 
carriers. We measure on-time arrival performance as the flight-weighted average of all 
wholly-owned subsidiaries and airline-booked flights (to capture capacity purchase 
agreements). 
 The next two operations based variables, Fleet and Airport Concentration, 
measure operational focus (Lapre & Scudder, 2004; Lapre & Tsikriktsis, 2006; 
Tsikriktsis, 2007) and purchasing/pricing market power (Berry, 1990; Borenstein, 1989; 
Evans & Kessides, 1993; Gimeno & Woo, 1999). We expect that changes in operational 
focus are positively associated with changes in future earnings. 
 The final two operations based variables represent an airline’s structural choices 
in operations. Flight Length and Seats/Aircraft measure components of route and fleet 
structure found to be associated with flight cost behavior and fuel efficiency (Baltagi, 
                                                                                                                                                 
ignore other sources of service quality (Lapre & Scudder, 2004). We compare results using consumer 
complaints, involuntary overbooking and mishandled baggage for a subsample (see footnote 4). 
4 We substitute Consumer Complaints, Involuntary Overbooking and Mishandled Baggage using 1997-
2007 data. We find that changes in Consumer Complaints predict future earnings pre-9/11 while the level 
of Consumer Complaints predicts future earnings post-9/11 tragedy. Neither changes nor the level of 
Involuntary Overbooking predicts future earnings. Interestingly, changes in Mishandled Baggage have a 
negative relationship with changes in future earnings pre-9/11 and a positive relationship with changes in 
future earnings post-9/11 tragedy. In summary, with the exception of Involuntary Overbooking, all service 





Griffin & Rich, 1995; Borenstein, 1989). Specifically, costs are found to be increasing at 
a decreasing rate in Flight Length. We expect similar increasing returns to scale with 
aircraft size (Seats/Aircraft). As a result, we expect that changes in our structural 
variables are positively associated with changes in future earnings. 
 Table 1.1 provides descriptive statistics and precise definitions for each variable 
in our study. In many cases, we normalize each variable by the number of available seat 
miles for each airline. Normalizing by ASM is the standard industry convention for 
comparing data between airlines. 
 Our second set of tests use operations based variables (in combination with 
earnings components) to predict analyst forecast errors (equations 1.9 and 1.10). As 
mentioned above, temporal (quarter and year) and firm effects provide a natural 
benchmark against which we can compare the explanatory power of various information 
sets. Additionally, we include earnings components in our baseline model (Abarbanell, 
1991; Abarbanell & Bushee, 1997). Significant improvements in explanatory power 
resulting from operations based variables imply that analysts are not fully impounding the 
available predictive information. Figure 1.2 shows the forecast errors over quarters in our 
sample. Note the exceptionally large forecast error in the quarter containing September 
11, 2001 as well as the substantial increase in the average forecast error in the following 
quarters. 
 Our data structure is best described as a time-series cross-section dataset. Our 
airlines provide nine firms over which we measure from 46 (Northwest) to 59 useable 
observations (Southwest and Alaska airlines). We use three types of indicator variables to 





Descriptive Statistics and Data Definitions 
Variable (N=499)1,2 Description Mean Median Std. Min. Max. 
Dependent Variable 
Net Income / ASM Net Income / ASM  0.04¢  0.18¢ 0.71¢ (3.52¢) 1.31¢ 
Earnings Components 
Operating Income / ASM Operating Income + Net Interest / ASM  0.18¢  0.31¢ 0.99¢ (3.38¢) 2.46¢ 
Nonoperating Income / 
ASM 
Nonoperating Income – Taxes / ASM (0.09¢) (0.08¢) 0.56¢ (5.96¢) 7.93¢ 
Efficiency 
RPM / ASM (RPM / ASM) x 100% 71.0% 70.5% 5.9% 50.4% 86.4% 
Airtime Average airtime hours / aircraft3-day) 8.11 8.04 0.79 3.76 10.80 
Service Quality 
On-Time Arrival % on-time arrivals x 100% 79.0% 79.5% 5.1% 55.4% 94.3% 
Focus 
Fleet Concentration Herfindahl Concentration Index of Aircraft type 20.1% 14.9% 13.2% 9.3% 75.5% 
Airport Concentration Herfindahl Concentration Index of Airport departures 4.7% 3.9% 2.1% 2.4% 10.8% 
Fleet/Flight Structure       
Flight Length (ASM / flight) / (seats / aircraft3) 666 675 160 331 978 
Seats / Aircraft Average seats / aircraft3 141 135 22 95 196 
1 Throughout the sample time period, major airlines added and divested subsidiary airlines and engaged in capacity purchase agreements. Subsidiary and 
capacity purchase agreement operations data, when available, was added to major airlines for all quarters in which subsidiary and capacity purchase 
agreement accounting performance was reflected in consolidated numbers to enhance comparability. 
2 Net Income and related earnings components were hand-collected from SEC filings and were reconciled to match IBES reported actual net income. 
Operations-based data is collected from SEC filings, monthly Air Travel Consumer Report (ATCR) issued by the U.S. Department of Transportation, and 
the Transtats database offered by the Bureau of Transportation Services. 





$ Forecast Error per ASM by Quarter 
 
cross-sectional correlation (temporal effects that impact all firms) by including year 
dummy variables. Second, we control for quarterly seasonality effects by including 
quarter dummy variables in the levels model and use seasonal changes (i.e., 1st quarter 
2007 – 1st quarter 2006) in the changes model. Finally, we control for firm fixed effects 
(systematic differences between firms over time) by including firm dummy variables. 
Additionally, we use panel-corrected standard errors (Beck & Katz 1995, Beck 2001, 
Lapre & Tsikriktsis 2006, Petersen, 2009) to correct for cross-sectional and 



































































Table 1.2 Panels A and B address the central question whether operations based 
variables contain incremental predictive information beyond that conveyed by the 
earnings components models (equation 1.6 and 1.7). The first column reports the 
significance (F-statistic) of the difference in R-squared between the earnings components 
model and the model including all operations based variables. The second column reports 
the significance of the difference in explanatory power for the subsample consisting of all 
quarters prior to September 11, 2001 while the third column reports this significance for 
all quarters after September 11, 2001. 
Results 
Additionally, we test each operations based variable for incremental explanatory 
power. We do this in an effort to isolate which operations based variables provide 
incremental explanatory power in predicting future earnings and whether the industry 
shock associated with the September 11, 2001 tragedy impacts the predictive relevance of 
specific operations based variables. The results of these tests are reported in Table 1.2 
Panels A and B, rows two through eight. 
Consider the results for the levels model (equation 1.6) first. We observe that the 
added operations variables are highly significant in the regression model (p<0.001). 
Further, we observe that on-time arrival, the airport concentration, and the number of 
seats per aircraft are adding significant statistical power across the entire sample. This 
confirms the prior work on service quality by Lapre and Scudder (2004) as well as the 
importance of having a strong presence at some airports so to have a larger local pricing 





Incremental Explanatory Power in Earnings Prediction 
PANEL A – Levels Model 
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F-statistic indicating significant incremental explanatory power 
All Operations Variables 11.68*** 11.79*** 4.72*** 
 Efficiency:   
RPM/ASM   0.00   6.03*   0.00 
Airtime   2.72   0.87   9.16** 
 Service Quality:   
On-Time Arrival 30.28*** 43.18***   2.10 
 Focus:   
Fleet Concentration   1.99   0.00   8.63** 
Airport Concentration   7.69**   3.10   0.24 
 Fleet/Flight Structure:   
Flight Length   1.44   0.63   1.69 
# of Seats/Aircraft   4.54*   5.05*   0.00 
PANEL B – Changes Model 
ttm
M
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All Operations Variables   5.64***   8.44*** 2.92** 
 Efficiency:   
Δ(RPM/ASM)   0.00   0.19 0.05 
Δ(Airtime)   6.13*   2.43 1.84 
 Service Quality:   
Δ(On-Time Arrival) 15.00*** 37.68*** 1.10 
 Focus:   
Δ(Fleet Concentration)   1.82   0.19 7.24** 
Δ(Airport Concentration)   8.72**   6.02* 0.00 
 Fleet/Flight Structure:   
Δ(Flight Length)   0.43   4.14* 0.16 
Δ(# of Seats/Aircraft)   6.93**   6.56* 5.90* 
All variables are defined as in Table 1.1. 
Each cell provides the F-statistic associated with the difference in explanatory power (R-squared) between 
models with and without the operations-based variable(s) that label each row. Panel A uses variations of 
equation 1.6 and Panel B uses variations of equation 1.7. 




It is interesting to compare the role of operations based variables in the two 
subsamples, quarters prior September 11, 2001 and quarters following September 11, 
2001. In both subsamples, operations-based variables are collectively highly significant, 
as is indicated by the large F-statistic (p<0.001). However, it is interesting to observe that 
which operations based variables are driving earnings differs fundamentally between the 
two subsamples. Prior to September 11, 2001, aircraft load factor (RPM/ASM), on-time 
arrival and seats/aircraft (aircraft size) levels contain the significant incremental 
predictive information (p<0.05, p<0.001 and p<0.05, respectively). 
In contrast, airtime and fleet concentration contain the significant incremental 
predictive information (p<0.01) in the quarters following September 11, 2001. This 
confirms that the events of September 11, 2001 have fundamentally altered the dynamics 
of the airline industry. While operations based variables are important before and after 
September 11, 2001, the importance shifted from service quality to focus and efficiency 
alone. 
Next, consider the changes model. We again see a strong support for the 
significance of operations based variables. Just as in the levels model, we observe that the 
operations based variables that predict financial performance differ in the two 
subsamples. Changes in on-time arrival percentage, airport concentration and flight 
length provide incremental predictive information (p<0.001, p<0.05 and p<0.05 
respectively) for the time up to September 11, 2001, while change in fleet concentration 
only becomes relevant (p<0.01) in the following quarters (Table 1.2 Panel B). Changes in 
seats/aircraft, on the other hand, is relevant (p<0.05) throughout the sample periods. 




variables collectively help explain future earnings, yet the relative importance of the 
operations based variables is altered fundamentally after the industry turmoil following 
September 11, 2001. 
Table 1.3 Panels A and B use levels and changes to examine the question whether 
analysts fully impound relevant operations based predictive information in their earnings 
forecasts. As a baseline, we establish a model that uses quarter, year and firm dummy 
variables and earnings components to measure temporal and firm-specific shocks while 
controlling for accounting information that might predict forecast error. We refer to this 
as the baseline model. We then examine whether operations based variables predict 
forecast error beyond that which is explained by the baseline model. The first column 
reports the significance (F-statistic) of the incremental explanatory power (difference in 
R-squared) provided by operations based variables using the full sample. Columns two 
and three repeat the analysis for the pre- and post- September 11, 2001 subsamples. 
The first row reports the significance of the incremental explanatory power 
associated with operations based variables in aggregate. Rows two through eight report 
the incremental explanatory power of each operations based variable. We see that the full 
sample (first column) results are consistent whether using levels or changes. Operations 
based variables in aggregate explain a significant proportion of forecast error (p<0.01 or 
stronger). Specifically, on-time arrival and airport concentration are not fully impounded 
(p<0.01 or stronger). 
It is interesting to note that operations based variables only predict forecast error 
after September 11, 2001. This suggests that analysts were completely utilizing 





Incremental Explanatory Power Predicting Analyst Forecast Error 
PANEL A – Levels Model 
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F-statistic indicating significant incremental explanatory power 
All Operational Variables   5.93*** 1.25 2.82** 
 Efficiency:   
RPM/ASM   0.00 0.05 1.88 
Airtime   0.54 0.00 2.73 
 Service Quality:   
On-Time Arrival 15.18*** 3.54 4.90* 
 Focus:   
Fleet Concentration   3.38 1.92 4.14* 
Airport Concentration   8.94** 1.87 0.22 
 Fleet/Flight Structure:   
Flight Length   3.26 1.55 2.27 
# of Seats/Aircraft   0.06 0.05 4.42* 
PANEL B – Changes Model 
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All Operational Variables   3.51** 1.53   5.63*** 
 Efficiency:   
Δ(RPM/ASM)   1.69 3.05   0.09 
Δ(Airtime)   1.97 0.09   8.32** 
 Service Quality:   
Δ(On-Time Arrival) 10.02** 0.00   0.98 
 Focus:   
Δ(Fleet Concentration)   0.00 0.00 14.83*** 
Δ(Airport Concentration)   6.91** 3.33   2.26 
 Fleet/Flight Structure:   
Δ(Flight Length)   0.34 0.00   0.76 
Δ(# of Seats/Aircraft)   0.51 2.63   1.41 
All variables are defined as in Table 1.1. 
Each cell provides the F-statistic associated with the difference in explanatory power (R-squared) between 
models with and without the operations-based variable(s) that label each row. Panel A uses variations of 
equation 1.9 and Panel B uses variations of equation 1.10. 




their prediction models following the industry turmoil associated with the terroristic 
attacks. As a consequence, they failed to completely impound operations based 
information after September 11, 2001. 
Specifically, analysts have not fully impounded the predictive information 
(unique to operations based variables) provided by changes in airtime (p<0.01), the level 
of on-time arrival (p<0.05), the level and change in fleet concentration (p<0.05 and 
p<0.001) and finally, the level of seats/aircraft (p<0.05). 
This is consistent with the results shown earlier (Table 1.2) when we found that 
 the levels of on-time arrival and seats/aircraft and level of and change in fleet 
concentration only provide incremental explanatory power in predicting future earnings 
for the subsample of quarters preceding September 11, 2001. It is possible that analysts 
kept using their prediction models that were fixated on the pre-9/11 period, emphasizing 
variables such as on-time arrival, seats/aircraft and fleet concentration. Given, however, 
the structural change in the industry, including the emergence of new operational 
variables driving financial performance, this created systematic forecast errors for the 
time period after September 11, 2001. 
Since changes in operations based variables are generally uncorrelated with one 
another, it is possible to quantify their impact on the forecast error. Table 1.4 shows the 
impact of changes in operations based variables on the forecast error. Recall that prior to 
September 11, 2001 no operations based variables predict forecast error. In contrast, three 
operations based variables are significant in the post-9/11 subsample (ΔAirtime, ΔFleet 
Concentration and ΔFlight Length). Analyst forecasts are systematically overstated 







Incremental Explanatory Power Predicting Forecast Errors – Reported with Coefficients 
– Changes Model 
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Error/ASM  -0.03¢  -0.05¢   0.03¢ 
       
Intercept -0.002**  -0.001   0.000  
 Earnings Components      
Δ(Operating 
Income/ASM) -0.010   0.067  -0.140** -0.03¢ 
Δ(Nonoperating 
Income/ASM) -0.016   0.001  -0.058  
 Usage Efficiency:      
Δ(RPM/ASM)  0.005   0.010   0.011  
Δ(Airtime) -0.000  -0.000  -0.001*** -0.03¢ 
 Service Quality:      
Δ(On-Time Arrival)  0.007*  0.00¢  0.002   0.002  
 Focus:      
Δ(Fleet Concentration)  0.001  -0.001   0.083***  0.03¢ 
Δ(Airport Concentration) -0.090  -0.043  -0.204  
 Fleet/Flight Structure:      
Δ(Flight Length) -0.000  -0.000   0.000***  0.01¢ 
Δ(# of Seats/Aircraft)  0.000   0.000   0.000  
Adjusted R-squared 0.362  0.578  0.491  
All variables are defined as in Table 1.1. 
Each pair of columns provides 1) regression results and 2) average forecast error magnitudes in total (1st 
row) and forecast error magnitudes associated with operations-based variables that predict forecast error. 
All coefficients are unstandardized. 




(positive coefficient) following increases in fleet concentration and flight length. An 
additional 1/10th of an hour of airtime/day (out of an average 8.1 hrs/day) results in an 
increase of between 2-3¢/share in forecast error. 
 Similarly, 1/10th of a percentage point change in fleet concentration (out of an 
average concentration of 20.1%) and 10 miles change in average flight length (out of an 
average flight length of 666 miles) also result in 2-3¢/share additional forecast error. As 
reference, the average median consensus forecast error/year for the post-9/11 subsample 
ranges from -10¢/share to 21¢/share. 
 
This study uses the airline industry to study the predictive value and analyst use of 
operations based variables in forecasting future earnings. We show that operations based 
variables significantly increase the predictive power of accounting-based earnings 
prediction models. Moreover, the categories of operations based variables that explain 
future earnings change following the terroristic attacks of September 11, 2001. The 
aircraft load factor is the important measure of efficiency prior to September 11, 2001 
while the airtime becomes significant after September 11, 2001. Similarly, on-time 
arrival is an important measure of service quality providing explanatory power for 
predicting future earnings prior to September 11, 2001, yet loses this power afterwards. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
We also show that the predictive information found in operations based variables 
is not fully impounded in analyst forecasts. Forecast errors can be explained using 
operations based variables. Moreover, we show that this is especially the case after 




new realities of the airline industry. 
Our research design, emphasizing industry-specific operations based variables, 
required us to focus on one single industry. Analyzing the relationship between 
operations based variables, financial performance, and earnings prediction requires 
replicating our research design to other industries. Moreover, it would be interesting to 
study if and to what extent there exist events that can shift the relationship between 
operations based variables and earnings in an equally substantial manner as happened on 
September 11, 2001 in the airline industry. At the time of this writing, the financial 
services sector is in a deep crisis and many of the United States leading financial 
institutions lost more than half of their market value in a matter of days. It seems unlikely 
that this would not fundamentally alter the nature of the industry and the set of operations 
based variables that best predict future success. 
 
Abarbanell, J. 1991. Do analysts' earnings forecasts incorporate information in prior 
stock price changes? Journal of Accounting and Economics 14, 147-165. 
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DETERMINANTS OF STICKY COSTS: AN ANALYSIS OF 
COST BEHAVIOR USING UNITED STATES AIR 
TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRY DATA 
 
 
Recent cost accounting research identifies costs that respond asymmetrically to 
increases and decreases in total revenue, a phenomenon described as sticky cost behavior 
(Banker, Byzalov, & Plehn-Dujowich, 2010a). Researchers have examined sticky costs in 
an effort to glean information about management capacity decisions in the face of 
changing demand. Cost will decrease at a slower rate than it increases relative to revenue 
changes in any of three situations: 1) management retains unused capacity as demand 
falls in anticipation of future demand resurgence, 2) management adjusts capacity to 
match sales volume but incurs greater cost when adding capacity than they save by 
reducing capacity, and 3) management lowers output selling price to increase sales 
volume as demand decreases to a larger extent than they raise selling price as demand 
grows. The vast majority of the extant literature focuses on the first explanation (see 
Banker et al., 2010a for a survey of the literature). In this paper, I provide industry-





price change and not associated with management retaining unused capacity. In 
combination, this evidence suggests that there are multiple determinants of sticky cost 
behavior and illustrates the importance of precision in modeling if we wish to glean 
information about management decisions from sticky costs. 
 
Much of the extant literature suggests that sticky cost behavior arises when 
management does not adjust capacity to match fluctuating demand (e.g., Anderson, 
Banker, & Janakiraman, 2003). This explanation assumes that management does not 
adjust capacity because: 1) capacity change is costly and 2) there is some probability that 
the demand fluctuation is temporary. For example, consider capacity decisions in the air 
transportation industry. Assume there are adjustment costs associated with adding and 
removing aircraft from the fleet (e.g., seller/buyer search costs, customization/scrap costs, 
purchase agreement deposits/termination penalties). Facing a drop in demand, airline 
management must decide whether to retain or remove excess capacity. Sticky costs arise 
when management retains underutilized aircraft because they determine that the cost of 
carrying excess capacity (depreciation, rental expense, etc.) is less than the costs of 
aircraft disposal and future aircraft acquisition if demand resurges. Throughout this 
paper, I refer to this explanation as “incomplete matching” of capacity and sales volume. 
 Sticky costs also result when the marginal cost of adding capacity exceeds the 
marginal benefit from removing capacity as management matches capacity with sales 
volume (Anderson & Lanen, 2009). To illustrate, consider capacity adjustment in the air 
transportation industry. Total cost would increase at an increasing rate as management 




aircraft is increasing. Conversely, total cost would decrease at a decreasing rate as 
management removes aircraft in response to falling demand when the marginal benefit 
from selling aircraft is decreasing. In this case, sticky costs result as total cost increases at 
a faster rate than it decreases as management adjusts capacity to match changing sales 
volume. 
 Finally, management may also respond to fluctuating demand by adjusting output 
selling price to match sales volume with capacity. In fact, economic theory suggests that 
profit-maximizing management will adjust output selling price to match the changing 
marginal cost of adding (benefit from reducing) capacity. Consider output selling price 
adjustment in the air transportation industry. Management would choose to raise output 
selling price instead of adding capacity when the cost of each additional aircraft increases 
with growing demand. Similarly, management would choose to lower output selling price 
instead of removing capacity when the benefit from selling aircraft decreases with falling 
demand. Sticky costs result when management drops output selling price faster as 
demand falls than they increase selling price as demand grows. Management will drop 
selling price faster than they increase it when it is more costly to remove capacity than to 
add capacity, a condition considered necessary by the extant literature for sticky costs to 
arise from incomplete capacity adjustment (Banker et al., 2010a). 
 I make three contributions to the sticky cost literature. First, using a precise model 
specification, I rule out the incomplete matching explanation for sticky costs in the 
United States (US) Air Transportation industry. Second, I find evidence that sticky costs 




from removing capacity as management makes capacity adjustments. Finally, I 
demonstrate that output selling price change contributes to sticky costs by identifying an 
asymmetric association between cost changes and selling price change. 
 The remainder of Chapter 2 is organized as follows: Section 2.2 develops 
hypotheses and the research design. Section 2.3 describes the US Air Transportation 
industry sample. Section 2.4 discusses empirical results. Section 2.5 provides robustness 
tests and Section 2.6 concludes. 
 
 Sticky cost behavior describes an asymmetric cost response to increases and 
decreases in revenue. The predominant explanation for sticky costs is that management 
leaves capacity unchanged as demand falls.
Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
5
                                                 
5 Working papers by Anderson and Lanen (2009) and Balakrishnan, Labro, and Plehn-Dujowich (2010) are 
exceptions. Anderson and Lanen suggest and offer evidence that sticky cost behavior is neither prevalent 
nor consistent with the incomplete matching explanation (Anderson et al., 2003). Balakrishnan et al. model 
and use simulated data to provide evidence that sticky costs can arise from committed fixed cost. This 
paper uses the Balakrishnan et al. model that removes the influence of committed fixed cost. 
 I argue that we can also observe sticky costs 
when management adjusts capacity and/or output selling price. Specifically, I suggest 
that costs increase faster than they decrease when the marginal cost of adding capacity 
exceeds the marginal benefit from removing capacity as management makes capacity 
adjustments. I further argue that sticky costs can arise when management adjusts sales 
volume by changing output selling price. Sticky costs can arise when management lowers 
output selling price to a greater degree when demand falls than they raise it when demand 
grows. Management will adjust prices accordingly when the marginal benefit from 




The following subsections develop the hypotheses that sticky costs are associated with 
incomplete matching of capacity and sales volume, and that sticky costs are associated 
with changing capacity and output selling price. Further, they provide model 
specifications that test these hypotheses. 
 
Incomplete Matching of Capacity and Sales Volume as a 
Determinant of Sticky Cost Behavior 
 
Noreen and Soderstrom (1997) first identify asymmetric cost responses while 
using hospital data to assess the accuracy of proportional cost models. In 2003, Anderson 
et al. coin the phrase “sticky costs” to describe costs that increase faster than they 
decrease with revenue change. Balakrishnan, Labro, and Soderstrom (2010) propose the 
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Variables: 
tiC ,  = Total cost for firm i at time t 
                                                 
6 Anderson et al. (2003) propose a model based on logarithmic total cost and total revenue changes. Using 
simulated data, Balarishnan et al. (2010) demonstrate that the Anderson et al. model captures ‘mechanical’ 
sticky cost behavior associated with committed fixed cost. Balakrishnan et al. propose an alternative 
specification that eliminates committed fixed cost from the dependent variable by removing committed 
fixed cost from the denominator of the dependent variable. I remove committed fixed cost effects by 
deflating cost change by lagged output quantity. 
7 Note that the Balakrishnan et al. (2010) regression omits the main effect of the decreasing revenue 
indicator variable (DECi,t). Implicit in its omission is that any difference between cost changes in times of 
increasing and decreasing revenue is only associated with costs that vary with changes in revenue. I relax 




tiq ,  = Output quantity for firm i at time t 
tiR ,  = Sales revenue for firm i at time t 
tiDEC ,  = An indicator variable set to 1 if revenue decreased for firm i in time t, and 
set to 0 otherwise 
0β  = Parameter that estimates systematic cost change unassociated with revenue 
change 
1β  = Parameter that estimates the association between cost change and a 
revenue increase 
2β  = “Sticky cost” parameter that estimates the difference between cost change 
associated with a sales revenue decrease and change associated with a sales 
revenue increase 
ti ,ε  = Cost change estimation error term for firm i at time t 
 
The intercept ( )0β  captures systematic cost change that is not associated with sales 
revenue change. Parameter estimates ( )1β  and ( )21 ββ +  measure the rate of cost change 
relative to revenue change during periods of increasing and decreasing revenue. Cost 
exhibits sticky behavior if it increases at a faster rate than it decreases with revenue 
changes. A negative 2β  coefficient indicates sticky costs. 
 Anderson et al. (2003) attribute sticky costs to management’s incomplete 
matching of capacity and sales volume. They suggest that management, when faced with 
falling demand, will not remove capacity because 1) it is costly to adjust capacity and 2) 
there is some probability that demand will recover. Banker et al. (2010a) explain that 
profit-maximizing management face a trade-off between the cost of leaving capacity 




capacity today and the expected cost of reversing the capacity change in the future. They 
posit that we generally observe sticky costs because the adjustment cost of disposing of 
capacity typically exceeds that of adding capacity (Cooper & Haltiwanger, 2006) and 
demand is generally growing. Most of the remaining research focuses on explaining 
variation in sticky cost behavior by adding proxies for adjustment cost (Balakrishnan & 
Gruca, 2008; Chen, Lu, & Sougiannis, 2011; Dierynck & Renders, 2009; Kama & Weiss, 
2010) and economic outlook (Banker, Ciftci, & Mashruwala, 2010b; Kama & Weiss, 
2010) to equation 2.1.8,9
 
 
H2.1: Change in capacity relative to change in sales volume as revenue 
increases is greater than change in capacity relative to change in sales volume 
as revenue decreases. 
 
 Equation 2.1 provides an imprecise test of the incomplete matching of capacity 
and sales volume explanation for sticky costs. Specifically, it uses total cost to proxy for 
capacity and total revenue to proxy for sales volume. Replacing total cost ( )tiC ,  with 
output quantity ( )tiq ,  and total revenue ( )tiR ,  with sales volume ( )tiv ,  provides a more 
precise test of whether management retains unused capacity as sales volume falls. 
However, the model no longer accounts for the marginal cost of adding capacity and 
                                                 
8 A few papers use incomplete adjustment of capacity and sales volume to explain predictive associations 
between cost change and future profit (Anderson, Banker, Huang, & Janakiraman, 2007; Banker & Chen 
2006; Baumgarten, Bonenkamp, & Homburg, 2010). 
9 The literature that associates proxies for adjustment cost and economic outlook with sticky cost behavior 





marginal benefit from removing capacity. This is problematic because economic theory 
suggests that management’s capacity decision (the dependent variable) is influenced by 
the marginal cost of/benefit from adjusting capacity. Similarly, sales volume change (the 
independent variable) is determined by management’s output selling price decision, 
which is also influenced by the marginal cost of/benefit from adjusting capacity. 
Therefore, the regression is unspecified if it omits a proxy for the marginal cost of/benefit 
from adjusting capacity, resulting in biased parameter estimates.10
 One solution would be to include capacity unit cost change as an independent 
variable to proxy for the marginal cost of/benefit from adjusting capacity. However, 
capacity unit cost change is determined by capacity change (the dependent variable). 
Therefore, including capacity unit cost change as an independent variable induces a 
simultaneity bias, also resulting in biased parameter estimates.
 
11
                                                 
10 Specifically, an unspecified regression that excludes a construct correlated with both the independent and 
dependent variables suffers from omitted-variable bias. This bias results when the statistical model 
compensates for the omitted variable by over- or understating the statistical significance of another 
independent variable (Greene, 1993). 
 To mitigate this 
problem, I use a two-stage least-squares approach to produce an exogenous instrumental 
variable for capacity unit cost change, thereby avoiding biased parameter estimates. 
Specifically, the first-stage regression estimates capacity unit cost change using industry-
level capacity unit cost change and three proxies for firm-level production function 
change (see Appendix A for the instrumental variable regression specification and 
results). Industry-level capacity unit cost change proxies for changes in the market value 
of capacity and industry-standard adjustment costs outside management’s control. 
11 Simultaneity bias results in over- or understated parameter estimates as the model compensates for 




Essentially, this assumes that management is presented with an exogenous set of 
costs/benefits from adjusting capacity offered by the industry.12
 
 The production function 
proxies capture firm-level production function changes that influence capacity unit cost 
(Banker & Johnston, 1993), but do not and are not influenced by management’s capacity 














































































tiv ,  = Sales volume for firm i at time t 
tic ,  = Average capacity unit cost ( )titi qC ,,  for firm i at time t 
{}iv  = Instrumental variable operator 
0θ  = Parameter that estimates systematic output quantity change unassociated 
sales volume change 
1θ  = Parameter that estimates the association between output quantity change 
and sales volume change during periods when revenue is increasing 
2θ  = “Sticky cost” parameter that estimates the difference in the association 
between output quantity change and sales volume change when revenue is 
increasing and decreasing 
                                                 
12 The specification assumes that any particular firm’s capacity decision does not influence industry-level 
capacity unit costs. It is possible that management across all firms in the US Air Transportation industry 
behave identically with respect to capacity change. In this case, industry-level capacity unit cost change is 
simultaneously determined by firm-level capacity change (as a proxy for industry-level capacity change). It 
does not appear that this is the case because the pairwise correlation between industry- and firm-level 




3θ  = Parameter that estimates association between output quantity change and 
an exogenous proxy for change in average capacity unit cost 
ti,ω  = Output quantity change estimation error term for firm i at time t 
 
Parameter estimates 1θ  and 21 θθ +  measure output quantity change associated with sales 
volume change as revenue increases and decreases, respectively. A negative 2θ  
coefficient indicates that management reduces output quantity at a slower rate than they 
increase it with sales volume changes. This provides the empirical test of hypothesis 2.1 
and is consistent with the incomplete matching explanation for sticky costs offered by the 
extant literature. A mathematical derivation of parameter estimates 1θ  and 21 θθ +  is 
included in Appendix B. 
 
Capacity and Output Selling Price Changes as Determinants 
of Sticky Cost Behavior 
 Sticky costs also arise when total cost increases faster as management adds 
capacity than it decreases as management removes capacity. This phenomenon is 
consistent with increasing marginal cost of adding capacity (a condition that 
Balakrishnan et al., 2010 term “diseconomies of scale”) and decreasing marginal benefit 
from removing capacity. For example, consider a capacity resource such as an aircraft 
whose aggregate supply is limited and which has few uses beyond air transportation. As 
demand for air transportation grows, the marginal cost of an additional aircraft increases 
due to limited supply. Conversely, as demand falls, the marginal benefit from selling the 




excess aircraft capacity. 
 In this case, sticky costs arise not because management retains unused resources 
but because the marginal cost of adding capacity exceeds the marginal benefit from 
removing capacity. Anderson and Lanen (2009) point out that adjustment costs increase 
the marginal cost of adding capacity and/or decrease the marginal benefit from removing 
capacity. As such, consistent with empirical results found in the literature (e.g., Anderson 
et al., 2003; Balakrishnan & Gruca, 2008), adjustment costs are expected to be positively 
associated with sticky costs that arise when management makes changes to its capacity in 
addition to when management retains unused capacity to avoid incurring adjustment cost. 
 
H2.2: Change in cost relative to change in capacity as revenue increases is 
greater than change in cost relative to change in capacity as revenue 
decreases. 
 
 Recall that sticky costs are generally defined by total costs that increase faster 
than they decrease with changes in total revenue (equation 2.1).13
                                                 
13 Balakrishnan and Gruca (2008) find evidence of sticky costs when replacing revenue with patient-days as 
an activity measure. 
 Total revenue is the 
product of sales volume and output selling price and therefore influenced by price 
change. As a result, sticky costs may manifest themselves when management adjusts 
output selling price to change sales volume as opposed to adjusting capacity. Specifically, 
sticky costs result when management lowers output selling price to a greater degree as 




profit-maximizing management will reduce output selling price to match decreasing 
marginal benefit from removing capacity as demand falls. Similarly, management will 
increase output selling price to match increasing marginal cost of adding capacity. It 
follows that sticky costs arise when the marginal benefit from removing capacity 
decreases faster than the marginal cost of adding capacity increases. This phenomenon is 
consistent with disposition cost that exceeds acquisition cost, a condition considered 
necessary for sticky costs to result from incomplete matching of capacity and sales 
volume (Banker et al., 2010a).14
 
 
H2.3: Change in cost relative to change in output selling price as revenue 
increases is greater than change in cost relative to change in output selling 
price as revenue decreases. 
 
 Hypothesis 2.2 suggests that costs change asymmetrically because the marginal 
cost of adding capacity exceeds the marginal benefit from removing capacity as 
management makes capacity adjustments. To test hypothesis 2.2, I must empirically 
isolate cost change associated with capacity adjustment. I do this by using output quantity 
instead of total revenue as an activity measure.15
                                                 
14 It is also possible the marginal benefit from removing capacity is lower than the marginal cost of 
increasing capacity because management recognizes disposition costs at the time the asset is sold while 
amortizing acquisition costs over an asset’s projected life. 
 Using output quantity isolates cost 
variation associated with changing marginal cost of adding capacity and marginal benefit 
15 Output quantity change is an imperfect proxy for capacity change if management changes the proportion 
of its capacity used to produce output. For example, in the Air Transportation industry, management may 
reduce the time in which aircraft are airborne, effectively reducing output without removing capacity. In 




from removing capacity (see Appendix B). Hypothesis 2.3 suggests that costs change 
asymmetrically with respect to revenue because management adjusts sales volume to 
match capacity by changing output selling price. Specifically, sticky costs arise when 
management reduces output selling price rather than cost to a larger degree as demand 
falls than they increase selling price instead of cost as demand grows. To test hypothesis 






























































































tip ,  = Average output selling price ( )titi vR ,,  for firm i at time t 
0φ  = Parameter that estimates systematic cost change unassociated with output 
quantity and output selling price changes 
1φ  = Parameter that estimates the association between cost change and 
output quantity change during periods when revenue is increasing 
2φ  = “Sticky cost” parameter that estimates the difference in the association 
between cost change and output quantity change when revenue is increasing 
and decreasing 
3φ  = Parameter that estimates the association between cost change and output 
selling price change during periods when revenue is increasing 
4φ  = “Sticky cost” parameter that estimates the difference in the association 
between cost change and output selling price change when revenue is 




ti ,τ  = Cost change estimation error term for firm i at time t 
 
Parameter estimates 1φ  and 21 φφ +  measure the marginal cost of adding output quantity as 
revenue increases and the marginal benefit from reducing output quantity as revenue 
decreases, respectively. A negative 2φ  coefficient indicates that the marginal cost of 
adding output is greater than the marginal benefit from removing output. This provides an 
empirical test of hypothesis 2.2 and is consistent with the increasing marginal cost 
of/decreasing marginal benefit from capacity adjustment explanation for sticky costs. By 
using output quantity instead of total revenue or sales volume to measure cost-generating 
activity, the parameter estimates are not influenced by incomplete matching of output 
quantity and sales volume. 
 Parameter estimates 3φ  and 43 φφ +  measure the extent to which management 
adjusts output selling price relative to cost as revenue increases and decreases. A negative 
4φ  coefficient indicates that management reduces selling price in lieu of cost reduction as 
demand decreases to a larger extent than they increase selling price in lieu of cost 
increases as demand grows. This provides an empirical test of hypothesis 2.3 and is 
consistent with the changing output selling price explanation for sticky costs. For further 
illustration, Appendix B provides a mathematical derivation of the parameter estimates. 
 
 The sample data structure can be characterized as a time-series cross-sectional 
Sample Description 




effects associated with all firms) by including year indicator variables and for firm fixed 
effects (systematic differences between firms over time) by including firm indicator 
variables (Petersen, 2009). I control for quarterly seasonality by calculating all changes 
using same quarters in subsequent years. Finally, the parameter estimates are calculated 
using generalized least squares regression with the Prais-Winsten estimator (Prais & 
Winsten, 1954) to correct for panel-specific auto-regression (Vogelsang, 1998). 
 The sample includes observations taken from nine airlines across 16 years (from 
1992 through 2007).16
 This study is, in part, a response to a recent call for industry-specific insights into 
sticky cost behavior (e.g., Balakrishnan et al., 2010). Industry-specific analysis increases 
the probability that sampled firms have similar cost structures and experience similar 
growth opportunities. Data from the US Air Transportation industry (airline industry) are 
particularly well-suited to identify determinants of sticky cost behavior for several 
 Continental Airlines and Northwest Airlines provide financial data 
beginning in 1994 and 1995, respectively. US Airways and America West Airlines 
merge, effective the third quarter of 2005. These missing data leave an initial sample size 
of 540 firm-quarters. The initial sample includes 31 observations that suffer from changes 
in accounting policy (e.g., reclassification of other expense to rental expense) or 
anomalous reporting (e.g., mismatched changes in affiliate revenue and cost). These 
observations are identified by inspecting observations with absolute studentized residuals 
greater than 3 and Cook’s D residuals greater than 2. The final sample consists of 509 
usable observations. The sample selection process is described in Table 2.1. 
                                                 
16 The airlines include Delta Airlines, United Airlines, America West Airlines, Southwest Airlines, US 








  Industry (1992 – 2007) 576 
Missing Data (Northwest Airlines begins 1995, Continental begins 1994) (24) 
US Airways/America West Airlines Merger (mid-1995) (12) 
  Subtotal Industry 540 
Outliers due to accounting changes and anomalies1  (31) 
  Total Sample 509 
1 Influential firm-quarter observations are identified using studentized residuals greater than 3 or less than –3 and 
Cook’s D residuals greater than 2. Each influential observation is examined to determine if it is associated with 
changes in accounting policy (i.e., Delta changed its accounting for regional carrier expense without a corresponding 
change in regional carrier revenue during 2006) or anomalous reporting (i.e., Due to the America West Airlines 
merger, US Airways did not report a full period of revenue during the first half of 2005). All observations 
influenced by changes in accounting policy and/or anomalous reporting are removed from the sample. 
 
 
reasons. First, a large proportion of the extant literature posits that sticky cost behavior 
arises from incomplete matching of capacity and sales volume (see Banker et al., 2010a 
for a summary of the literature). The airline industry provides identifiable units of 
capacity (available seat-miles, ASM) and sales volume (revenue passenger-miles, RPM), 
allowing the empirical comparison of changes in capacity and sales volume. 
 Second, airlines segregate their costs such that it is simple to form a measure of 
capacity expense (Banker & Johnston, 1993). Specifically, airlines report depreciation, 
aircraft rental payments, maintenance expense, and payments to regional affiliates. 
Further, these costs are generated by capital-intensive assets. Prior literature has 
positively associated capital-intensity (as a proxy for adjustment costs) with sticky costs 
(Anderson et al., 2003). Third, air transportation is relatively homogeneous, alleviating 




selling price (Anderson & Lanen, 2009). 
 Finally, the sample is comprised of firms that have experienced substantial 
variation in performance. Some airlines, such as Southwest, performed well while most 
(American, Delta, United, America West, US Airways, Continental and Northwest) have 
struggled. Each airline has experienced fluctuations in revenue, providing periods in 
which management must decide whether to retain/change capacity and/or sales volume. 
 All of the data were computed using quarterly Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) filings. Panel A of Table 2.2 provides descriptive statistics and data 
definitions. Panel B of Table 2.2 reports the number of firm-quarters in which revenue 
increases and decreases along with mean changes in capacity expense, total revenue, 
sales volume, output selling price, output quantity, and capacity unit cost for each 
subsample. Note that revenue is growing for the majority of sampled periods (410 out of 
509). This trend is consistent with larger samples used in the extant literature (e.g., 
Anderson et al., 2007; Banker et al., 2010a). As would be expected, capacity expense 
increases during revenue-increasing periods. However, capacity expense change does not 
differ from zero during revenue-decreasing periods. This is consistent with sticky costs 
(costs that decrease more slowly than they increase with fluctuating demand). The 
absolute magnitude of total revenue change is comparable between revenue-increasing 
and revenue-decreasing periods. In contrast, sales volume increases more than twice as 
much as it decreases. Conversely, average selling price decreases almost four times as 
much as it increases. This is consistent with output selling prices that decrease faster than 
they increase, preserving sales volume through lower prices as demand falls. Output 
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Table 2.2 
Descriptive Statistics and Data Definitions 
Panel A – Variable Descriptions and Statistics 






Capacity Expense tiC ,  
Payments to regional affiliates, maintenance expense, 











Output Quantity tiq ,  


































Output Selling Price tip ,  
Total net revenue divided by total aircraft seat-miles 
sold to passengers (Ri,t/vi,t) 
14.5¢ 14.3¢ 2.2¢ 13.1¢ 15.6¢ 


















CC  Seasonally-adjusted change in Capacity Expense 
divided by lagged Output Quantity 0.13¢*** 0.09¢*** 0.31¢ –0.01¢ 0.21¢ 
Independent Variables 
















RR  Seasonally-adjusted change in Revenue divided by 
lagged Revenue 6.0%*** 6.6%*** 11.1 pts 1.6% 11.3% 
















vv  Seasonally-adjusted change in RPM divided by 
lagged RPM 5.9%*** 5.4%*** 9.3 pts 1.0% 11.2% 
Percent Average 















pp  Seasonally-adjusted change in Output Selling Price 

















qq  Seasonally-adjusted change in Output Quantity 





Table 2.2 (continued) 
Panel B – Mean Values in Revenue-increasing and Revenue-decreasing subsamples 
Variable Variable Calculation Revenue-increasing Periods (DEC=0) 
Revenue-decreasing Periods 
(DEC=1) 
Firm-Quarters  410 99 
Capacity Expense 
Change (scaled by 

















CC  0.17¢*** –0.01¢ 


















RR  9.7%*** –9.1%*** 


















vv  8.2%*** –3.3%*** 
Percent Average 




































qq  5.8%*** –2.7%*** 
Percent Change in 


















cc  3.4%***   2.3%* 
    
tiC , = Total Cost for firm i at time t 
tiq , = Output quantity for firm i at time t 
tiR , = Sales revenue for firm i at time t 
tiv , = Sales Volume for firm i at time t 
tip , = Average Output Selling Price for firm i at time t 
tic , = Average Capacity Unit Cost for firm i at time t 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the p<0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels respectively (2-tailed test). 
 - Throughout the sample time period, major airlines add and divest subsidiary airlines and engage in capacity purchase 
agreements. Subsidiary and capacity purchase agreement operations data, when available, was added to major airlines 
for all quarters in which subsidiary and capacity purchase agreement accounting performance was reflected in 
consolidated numbers to enhance comparability. 
- Revenue and cost data were hand-collected from SEC filings and were reconciled to match IBES reported actual net 
income. Nonrecurring expense items are typically excluded. Operations-based data are collected from SEC filings, 
monthly Air Travel Consumer Report (ATCR) issued by the United States Department of Transportation, and the 





quantity (ASM) increases over twice as much as it decreases, suggesting that managers 
are more willing to add capacity than remove capacity with fluctuating demand. Finally, 
change in capacity unit cost is positive for both subsamples. This supports the conclusion 
that the marginal cost of adding capacity is increasing while the marginal benefit from 
removing capacity is decreasing during periods of revenue growth and decline, 
respectively. 
 
 Table 2.3 Panels A and B present regression results from applying airline industry 
data to equations 2.1 and 2.2, respectively. Table 2.3 Panel A reports results using 
equation 2.1 to perform sticky cost analyses consistent with those found in the extant 
literature (e.g., Anderson et al., 2003). Note that the adjusted R-squared is 0.328 
comparable with the adjusted R-squared (0.366) found in Anderson et al. (2003, Table 2 
Model I). The overall model is significant at the p<0.001 level. The sign of each equation 
2.1 parameter estimate is consistent with those found by Anderson et al. The negative 
value (p<0.001) on the sticky cost parameter (β2) indicates that capacity expense 
decreases at a slower rate than it increases with changes in revenue (i.e., airline capacity 
cost is sticky). The magnitude of the parameter estimates can be interpreted as cost 
change (in pennies per lagged ASM) associated with 1% change in revenue. 
Primary Results 
 Table 2.3 Panel B reports results using equation 2.2 to test hypothesis 2.1. Note 
that the adjusted R-squared is 0.785, indicating a much better fit than the model using 
total cost and revenue. The model is significant at a p<0.001 level. Output quantity 
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Table 2.3 
Determinants of Sticky Cost Behavior – Regression Results Using Cost and Revenue Changes Compared with Output Quantity and 
Sales Volume Changes 







































































































































































































































(θ2) (–) 0.066 
(1.00) 
 


















(θ3) (–) –0.193 
(–2.73)** 
 
Adjusted R2   0.328 Adjusted R2   0.785 
Firm-quarters (N)   509 Firm-quarters (N)   509 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the p<0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels, respectively (1-tailed test). 




change is positively associated with sales volume change during revenue-increasing 
periods (θ1>0, p<0.001), consistent with management increasing capacity to 
accommodate demand growth. The sticky cost parameter (θ2) does not significantly differ 
from zero (p<0.32), indicating that management does not decrease output quantity 
relative to sales volume at a slower rate as revenue falls than they increase it as revenue 
grows. This result does not support hypothesis 2.1. Further, it is inconsistent with sticky 
cost results found when estimating equation 2.1. Together, results from equations 2.1 and 
2.2 suggest that capacity expense is sticky, but not because management is hesitant to 
remove unused output. 
 Table 2.4 reports results using equation 2.3 to test hypotheses 2.2 and 2.3. Note 
that the adjusted R-squared is 0.329. The model is significant at a p<0.001 level. The 
negative value (p<0.001) on the output quantity sticky cost parameter (ϕ2) indicates that 
capacity expense decreases at a slower rate than it increases with changes in output 
quantity (i.e., capacity cost is sticky with respect to output quantity). This result supports 
hypothesis 2.2 and is consistent with increasing marginal cost of adding capacity and 
decreasing marginal benefit from removing capacity. The magnitude of the parameter 
estimates ϕ1 and ϕ1+ϕ2 can be interpreted as the marginal cost of adding output quantity 
and the marginal benefit from removing output (in dollars per ASM) as revenue increases 
and decreases, respectively (see Appendix B). 
The positive association (p<0.001) between cost change and output selling price 
change (ϕ3) suggests that management adds capacity (subsequently increasing cost) and 








Determinants of Sticky Cost Behavior – Regression Results Using Output Quantity and 
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(ϕ4) (–) –0.009 
(–3.40)*** 
Adjusted R2   0.329 
Firm-quarters (N)   509 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the p<0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels, respectively 
(1-tailed test). 







selling price sticky cost parameter (ϕ4) indicates that management reduces output selling 
price rather than cost when demand falls. This supports hypothesis 2.3 and is consistent 
with marginal benefit from removing capacity that decreases faster than the marginal cost 
of adding capacity increases. 
In summary, capacity cost in the airline industry is sticky with respect to revenue 
change. However, output quantity is not sticky with respect to sales volume. Together, 
these results suggest that sticky costs can arise from determinants other than incomplete 
matching of capacity and sales volume. Further evidence suggests that sticky costs are 
associated with increasing marginal cost of adding output and decreasing marginal 
benefit from removing output. The evidence also suggests that management lowers 
output selling price faster than they increase it as demand fluctuates. In combination, the 
results suggest that sticky capacity cost in the airline industry is associated with changing 
output quantity and output selling price as management matches output quantity and sales 
volume. 
 
I run three robustness tests to validate the primary results. First, Anderson and 
Lanen (2009) point out that the models offered in the extant literature omit the main 
effect of the decreasing revenue indicator variable (DECi,t). This specification implicitly 
assumes that costs do not change systematically during periods of increasing and 
decreasing revenue except through their association with revenue change (or other 





(DECi,t) to each model (equations 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3). In untabulated results, the main 
effect does not significantly differ from zero. Further, all other parameter estimates 
remain consistent with results reported in Tables 2.3 and 2.4. 
Second, Balakrishnan et al. (2010) suggest that variation in annual growth rates 
may influence sticky cost behavior. I include an interaction term between the decreasing 
revenue indicator variable (DECi,t) and year indicator variables to pick up systematic 
annual variation in asymmetric cost behavior. In untabulated results for each model 
(equations 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3), all parameter estimates remain consistent with the primary 
results reported. Additionally, the statistical fit (adjusted R-squared) of each model does 
not significantly increase by including the interaction terms. 
Third, it is possible that airline managers adjust ASM to match sales volume 
without adjusting the quantity of resources that generate ASM. For example, 
management may allow aircraft to sit idle for a greater proportion of each day during 
periods of decreasing revenue. In this situation, using ASM as a proxy for capacity, it 
may appear that airline managers are adjusting capacity to match sales volume when they 
are actually generating less output per capacity resource. I control for this effect by 
substituting number of fleet aircraft-seats for ASM. The pair-wise correlations between 
changes in ASM and aircraft-seats and changes in capacity expense per ASM and 
capacity expense per aircraft-seat are 0.711 (p<0.001) and 0.989 (p<0.001), respectively. 
Untabulated regression results from substituting aircraft-seats for ASM in 
equations 2.1 and 2.2 are consistent with results reported in Table 2.3, providing no 




is not associated with the incomplete matching of capacity and sales volume. Table 2.5 
reports regression results from substituting aircraft-seats for ASM in equation 2.3 to test 
hypotheses 2.2 and 2.3. The adjusted R-squared is 0.231, somewhat lower than the 
explanatory power using ASM (0.329, reported in Table 2.4). The model is significant at 
a p<0.001 level. The negative value (p<0.05) on the output quantity sticky cost parameter 
(ϕ2) supports hypothesis 2.2, indicating that capacity expense decreases at a slower rate 
than it increases with changes in output quantity. The sticky cost parameter on output 
selling price change (ϕ4) no longer supports hypothesis 2.3 (p=0.44). This result suggests 
that management adjusts output selling price to equivalent degrees as demand fluctuates. 
This is consistent with marginal cost that increases to the same extent that marginal 
benefit decreases as management adjusts capacity. To summarize, capacity cost using 
aircraft-seats is sticky, aircraft-seats are not sticky with respect to sales volume, and the 
marginal cost of adding aircraft-seats exceeds the marginal benefit from removing 
aircraft-seats. Finally, output selling price is not associated with sticky costs, suggesting 
the marginal benefit from removing aircraft-seats does not decrease faster than the 
marginal cost of adding aircraft-seats increases. 
 In summary, the robustness tests provide support for hypothesis 2.2, but do not 
consistently support hypotheses 2.1 and 2.3. Cost responds asymmetrically to output 
quantity change, indicative of marginal cost of adding capacity that exceeds the marginal 
benefit from removing capacity. However, output quantity does not respond 
asymmetrically to sales volume change and cost does not respond asymmetrically to 








Determinants of Sticky Cost Behavior – Regression Results Using Aircraft-Seats Instead 
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(ϕ4) (–) –0.000 
(–0.57) 
Adjusted R2   0.231 
Firm-quarters (N)   482 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the p<0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels, respectively 
(1-tailed test). 







 This study uses data from the US Air Transportation industry to investigate 
determinants of sticky cost behavior. Sticky cost behavior refers to asymmetric cost 
responses to changes in activity. The majority of the extant literature argues that sticky 
cost behavior arises when management does not fully adjust capacity to match changing 
sales volume (e.g., Anderson et al., 2003, 2007; Banker & Chen 2006). I argue that we 
can observe sticky cost behavior when management adjusts capacity and/or output selling 
price. 
Conclusion 
 I provide evidence that airline industry capacity cost is sticky with respect to 
revenue change. Further, I find evidence that output quantity is not sticky with respect to 
sales volume, indicating that management matches capacity and sales volume as demand 
fluctuates. Additionally, I find that sticky costs are associated with marginal cost of 
adding capacity that exceeds the marginal benefit from removing capacity. Finally, I 
provide some evidence that sticky costs are associated with output selling price change. 
Specifically, using ASM to proxy for capacity, I find that management lowers output 
selling price faster than they increase it as demand fluctuates. This behavior is consistent 
with marginal benefit from removing ASM that decreases faster than the marginal cost of 
adding ASM increases. 
 This paper has cost accounting implications beyond simply explaining sticky cost 
behavior as an empirical phenomenon in the airline industry. I illustrate the importance of 
precision in which activity measures we use in our cost models if we wish to glean 




that sticky costs in the airline industry are associated with management adjusting output 
quantity and output selling price as opposed to leaving quantity unchanged as suggested 
by the extant literature (e.g., Anderson et al., 2003). Note that the specific empirical 
results from this study are not intended to be generalized across all costs and industries 
(i.e., it is possible that costs in other industries are sticky because management retains 
unused capacity). The implication of this study is that the inferences about management 
actions that we can draw from sticky costs are limited by the precision of our sticky cost 
models. 
 It is important to recognize what management actions are associated with sticky 
cost behavior because cost changes associated with different management actions may 
provide differing expectations for future earnings. For example, the incomplete matching 
explanation offered by the extant literature suggests that cost change relative to revenue 
is positively associated with future earnings during revenue-decreasing periods because 
management retains unused resources in anticipation of demand resurgence (Anderson et 
al., 2007). In contrast, sticky costs arising from changing marginal cost/benefit from 
capacity adjustment and output selling price changes may indicate that management has 
matched capacity and sales volume, reaching a new equilibrium. Or, if capacity 
adjustment is costly, it is possible that sticky costs indicate that management chose to 
incur adjustment cost by matching capacity with sales volume because the economic 
outlook is bleak. I leave the investigation of relationships between determinants of sticky 





The instrumental variable for capacity unit cost change is derived by regressing 
firm-level changes on industry-level changes in average capacity unit cost together with 

































































































































tc  = The industry average capacity unit cost at time t 
tifltlth ,  = The average flight length (in miles) for firm i at time t 
tisize ,  = The average number of seats per aircraft for firm i at time t 
tifltconc ,  = A Herfindahl Index of fleet concentration for firm i at time t 
 
 Table A.1 reports descriptive statistics and data definitions for the production 
function variables used in equation 2.4. Table A.2 reports the first-stage regression results 
for the capacity unit cost change instrumental variable used in equation 2.2. 
 
 This appendix provides a mathematical derivation of the parameters found in 
equations 2.2 and 2.3. The firm subscript (i) is omitted for presentation purposes. 
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Table A.1 
Descriptive Statistics and Data Definitions 




        





















Seasonally-adjusted change in average flight 






  4.3 pts 
 
  0.5% 
 
  4.4% 
 


















Seasonally-adjusted change in average number 






















Seasonally-adjusted change in fleet 
homogeneity (Herfindahl Concentration Index) 
for firm i at time t 
0.1% 0.0%   9.4 pts (4.7%)   4.6% 
        
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the p<0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels, respectively (2-tailed test). 
 - Throughout the sample time period, major airlines add and divest subsidiary airlines and engage in capacity purchase agreements. Subsidiary and capacity purchase 
agreement operations data, when available, were added to major airlines for all quarters in which subsidiary and capacity purchase agreement accounting performance was 






































































































































             (2.4) 
Variable Parameter Expected Sign Equation (A-1): 
   Parameter 
(t-statistic) 















































































































(ς6) (–) –0.481 
(–2.35)* 
Adjusted R2   0.112 
Firm-quarters (N)   509 
‡,*, **, and *** indicate significance at the p<0.10, 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels, respectively (2-tailed test). 






Incomplete Matching of Output Quantity and Sales Volume 
 Parameters 1θ  and 21 θθ +  measure capacity utilization change when revenue is 
increasing and decreasing, respectively. For exposition, assume for now that capacity 































































                          (2.5) 
 
 The sticky cost parameter 2θ captures the difference in capacity adjustment 
between periods in which revenue is increasing and decreasing. Parameter 2θ is negative 
when ( ) ( )( )11 −− −− tttt vvqq  is greater in periods of increasing revenue than in periods of 
decreasing revenue. This is consistent with management retaining unused capacity 
(failing to completely adjust q to match v) as revenue falls. 
 
Changing Marginal Cost of/Benefit From Capacity Adjustment 
 Let total cost (Ct) be a function of committed fixed cost (Balakrishnan et al, 2010) 
and capacity unit cost excluding committed fixed cost (including variable, discretionary 
fixed, and adjustment costs): 
 
ttt qACCFCC ⋅+=                                                 (2.6) 
 
Variables: 




tAC  = The average number of seats per aircraft for firm i at time t 
 
Parameters 1φ  and 21 φφ +  measure the marginal cost of adding output quantity as 
revenue increases and the marginal benefit from reducing output quantity as revenue 
decreases, respectively. For exposition, assume for now that capacity unit cost is the same 









































































































ACACAC                                      (2.7) 
 
 The parameter estimate is constant across time and revenue conditions if the 
marginal cost of adding capacity is constant and equal to the marginal benefit from 
removing capacity. The second term is positive when increasing marginal cost of adding 




greater output quantity. In contrast, the second term is negative when decreasing marginal 
benefit from removing capacity causes average unit cost (excluding committed fixed 
cost) to increase with lower output quantity. As a result, increasing marginal cost of 
adding capacity coupled with decreasing marginal benefit from removing capacity results 




Output Selling Price Change 
 Parameters 3φ  and 43 φφ +  measure total cost change relative to output selling 
price change when revenue is increasing and decreasing, respectively. For exposition, 































































                         (2.8) 
 
 The parameter captures management’s tradeoff between adjusting capacity cost 
and output selling price. The sticky cost parameter 4φ is negative when
( ) ( )( )11 −− −− tttt ppCC  is greater in periods of increasing revenue than in periods of 
decreasing revenue.18
                                                 
17 This assumes that the average capacity unit cost at time t-1 is less than the marginal cost of adding an 
additional unit of capacity and greater than the marginal benefit from removing a unit of capacity at time t. 
Violation of this assumption biases against sticky cost results. 
 This is consistent with management lowering output selling price 
(as opposed to reducing cost) to a greater degree as demand falls than they raise selling 
price (as opposed to increasing cost) as demand grows. 
18 This assumes that the ratio of lagged output selling price to lagged output quantity ( )11 −− tt qp  does not 
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THE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN NONFINANCIAL 
DISCLOSURE AND FUTURE ECONOMIC 
BENEFITS: THE VALIDATING EFFECT 
OF VERIFIABLE DETAIL ON 
CREDIBILITY 
 
The purpose of this paper is to validate verifiable detail as a source of credibility 
in nonfinancial disclosures of customer retention strategy. Credibility implies that actual 
outcome is expected to match disclosed outcome. Credibility is established if the 
disclosure is costly to the sender (Spence, 1973). Disclosed verifiable detail may be a 
source of credibility by 1) committing management to a set of actions and 2) providing 
proprietary information to competitors. It is difficult to directly observe commitment and 
proprietary costs associated with verifiable detail. However, the validity of verifiable 
detail as a source of credibility can be inferred if actual outcome matches disclosed 
outcome. I provide evidence that verifiable detail is a valid source of credibility by 





two contributions to the voluntary disclosure literature. First, I use customer retention 
theory to establish a set of expected economic outcomes to validate the credibility of 
nonfinancial disclosure. Second, I find that verifiable detail is a valid source of credibility 
by associating it with future economic outcomes consistent with customer retention 
theory. 
 Disclosure provides firm constituents critical information requisite in assigning 
market value to a firm. Voluntary disclosure provides the opportunity to convey 
additional information that helps constituents evaluate the unique economic conditions of 
a firm un-captured by mandatory accounting requirements. Management can use 
voluntary disclosure to influence firm value (Verrecchia, 1983). They do this in two 
ways; through cost of capital, and by updating expected future cash flows. Literature has 
documented the former effect by associating precommitment to increased disclosure with 
changes in information asymmetry (e.g., Botosan & Harris, 2000; Leuz & Verrecchia, 
2000). The literature has also documented the association between management earnings 
(and other financial) forecasts and future performance as a proxy for expected future cash 
flows (see Hirst, Koonce, & Venkataraman, 2008 for a survey of the management 
forecast literature). 
 Nonfinancial disclosure is qualitative information conveyed by management to 
market constituents. The literature has found that management makes extensive use of 
nonfinancial disclosure. Hutton, Miller, and Skinner (2003) and Baginski, Hassell, and 
Kimbrough (2004) find that approximately 50% of management forecasts are qualitative 




contain financial information. The extensive use of nonfinancial disclosure suggests that 
it represents an important medium for management communication. However, there is 
relatively little research that associates nonfinancial disclosure with future performance 
(Hirst et al., 2008). The research shortfall may arise from a lack of established theoretical 
associations between nonfinancial variables and future performance. One way to address 
this problem is to identify a type of nonfinancial disclosure that, if credible, theoretically 
signals improved future performance. The voluntary disclosure of customer retention 
strategy provides such a setting. 
 Marketing theory suggests that customer retention results in a barrier to entry 
(e.g., Hibbard, Kumar, & Stern, 2001; Reichheld & Sasser, 1990). A barrier to entry 
(BTE) can be defined as an incumbent firm’s cost advantage over potential competitors 
such that abnormal profits persist without attracting market entrants (Bain, 1956). Stigler 
(1964) defines cost advantage as an operating cost that must be borne by market entrants 
that is not borne by incumbent firms. Examples include customer relationships, supplier 
relationships, and innovation (Dickinson & Sommers, 2008). Production/purchasing 
efficiencies also provide a BTE if firms are unable to enter a market at an efficient scale 
(Bain, 1956). Potential competitors are firms that, ceteris paribus, would enter a market to 
pursue abnormal profits. In this study, a market is defined by a set of customers. Thus, 
potential competitors include existing firms within an incumbent’s industry that may 
wish to attract its customers. 
 BTE strategy represents management’s effort to establish a cost advantage over 




then they will continue to enter the market until they become aware of the incumbent’s 
cost advantage. Alternatively, if potential competitors are made aware of the strategy, 
then they will either: 1) enter the market with a counter-strategy offsetting the cost 
advantage, or 2) choose not to enter the market because they believe that the incumbent’s 
cost advantage offsets any expected benefits from entry. Therefore, it behooves 
management to make competitors aware of the strategy if, and only if, they believe that 
they will respond by choosing not to enter the market (Barton & Waymire, 2004). 
Accordingly, credible voluntary disclosure of BTE strategy reveals information about 
management’s expectation regarding the strategy’s effectiveness. 
 Disclosures gain credibility if management incurs costs associated with the choice 
to disclose (Spence, 1973).19
                                                 
19 There is literature that suggests that costless disclosure, “cheap talk,” also influences outcome. For 
example, Farrell (1987) suggests that costless disclosure can lead to monopoly-like collusion in a 
marketplace. Farrell and Rabin (1996) suggest that costless disclosure may indirectly affect outcome, but 
not market efficiency. 
 BTE strategy disclosure incurs two types of costs. First, 
Lundholm (1999) and others (e.g., Hirst, Jackson, Koonce, & Petroni, 2003; Hutton et al., 
2003) suggest that ex post verification of forward-looking statements imposes cost on 
management by holding them responsible for disclosed actions. Second, potential 
competitors can use the disclosed proprietary information to create a counter-strategy 
offsetting the BTE as discussed above. Both of these costs increase in the level of 
verifiable detail provided by the disclosure. For example, consider a disclosure that 
describes a BTE associated with a customer retention program. This program can be 
expressed by activities such as the rollout of a new direct sales force, sales support 




be verified ex post and/or used by potential competitors, providing a basis for credibility. 
Alternatively, a disclosure may be limited to a statement that management is placing 
‘increased emphasis on customer retention,’ which is difficult to verify and cryptic in its 
interpretation by competitors. 
 I use disclosures of customer retention strategy (found in 10-K annual reports) to 
investigate the effect of verifiable detail on the association between nonfinancial 
disclosure and future economic performance. I find that customer retention strategy 
disclosure is positively associated with changes in the persistence of positive abnormal 
performance when accompanied by verifiable detail. This result is consistent whether the 
firms disclose a change in, or an ongoing strategy, indicating that the disclosure itself 
contributes to the BTE. To illustrate this point, firms that credibly disclose a change will 
show improved performance due to: 1) the effects of changing strategy that would have 
occurred without disclosure, and 2) deterring competitors from entering the market by 
making them aware of an impending BTE (disclosure effect). In contrast, firms that 
credibly disclose an ongoing strategy will improve performance through the disclosure 
effect.20
 The remainder of Chapter 3 is organized as follows: Section 3.2 provides a review 
of relevant literature and develops hypotheses, section 3.3 describes the sample and 
research design, section 3.4 reports primary results, section 3.5 provides additional 
 In conclusion, I find that, given the disclosure provides verifiable detail, the 
change in positive abnormal performance associated with firms that disclose a change in 
BTE strategy exceeds that of firms that disclose an ongoing strategy. 
                                                 
20 This assumes that the strategy was not transparent to external stakeholders prior to the disclosure. If the 




analysis useful in interpreting primary results, and section 3.6 concludes and offers 
direction for further research. 
 
 This study adds to a growing body of nonfinancial disclosure research by: 1) 
using BTE and customer retention theory to establish an expected set of ex post economic 
outcomes associated with credible nonfinancial disclosure and 2) identifying verifiable 
detail as a source of credibility for expected changes in future performance associated 
with nonfinancial disclosure. 
Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
 
Voluntary Disclosure 
 Corporate disclosure is requisite to an efficient market (Healy & Palepu, 2001). 
Disclosure regulation was instituted to provide “credible, transparent, and comparable 
financial information… to make sound investment and credit decisions” (Financial 
Accounting Standards Board). However, there is sufficient diversity between firms to 
invite supplementary voluntary disclosure to inform investment decisions. 
 Voluntary disclosure differs from mandatory disclosure in that it represents 
management’s willingness to convey private information to influence firm value by 
reducing cost of capital and/or by informing expected future cash flows (Dye, 2001). A 
large literature has investigated the association between disclosure and the information 
asymmetry components of cost of capital (e.g., Botosan & Harris, 2000; Lang & 
Lundholm, 1996; Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000). This study contributes to the literature that 




performance. The majority of research in this area has focused on management forecasts. 
Hirst et al. (2008) provide a survey of the management forecast literature using a 
framework that relates forecast characteristics (managerial discussion, directional news, 
forecast horizon, etc) with forecast consequences (analyst forecast revisions, changes in 
firm value, etc). Although this study does not involve earnings forecasts, Hirst et al. 
provide a framework useful in describing its contribution. This paper examines the 
association between sources of credibility (disclosure characteristics) and future 
performance (a disclosure consequence) given the choice to disclose nonfinancial 
information. 
 
 There is discussion regarding the prevalent use of nonfinancial management 
disclosures. Hutton et al. (2003) and Baginski et al. (2004) report that approximately half 
of the management forecasts sampled between 1993 and 1997 provide qualitative and 
open-ended forecasts, as opposed to point and range forecasts. Using management 
announcement data between 2002 and 2007, Nichols (2009) observes that the number of 
nonfinancial disclosures exceeds the number of earnings guidance disclosures yet very 
few studies look at associations between nonfinancial disclosure and future performance. 
The lack of empirical work using nonfinancial disclosure is likely due to difficulty in 
establishing ex ante expectations regarding future outcome (Hirst et al., 2008). I 
contribute to the nonfinancial disclosure literature by focusing on customer retention 
strategy, which offers theoretical and empirical predictions regarding expected future 





 Working papers by Lu (2009) and Nichols (2009) begin to fill the void in 
nonfinancial disclosure research. Lu studies the association between levels of 
nonfinancial disclosure (quantity and qualities of 10-K management discussion) and 
firms’ propensity to underinvest in positive net present value projects. In contrast, this 
study focuses solely on the credibility of 10-K customer retention strategy disclosure 
while Lu does not explicitly examine disclosure credibility and excludes strategy 
discussion from his sample. Nichols supplies evidence that proprietary cost provides 
credibility to nonfinancial disclosure. He associates the magnitude of positive market 
reactions with measures of proprietary cost. This study is similar to Nichols’ working 
paper in that it investigates sources of credibility in nonfinancial disclosure given the 
choice to disclose. 
 
 Disclosure credibility is founded in signaling theory, which suggests that the 
voluntary release of private information must be costly to the sender for constituents to 
believe it (Spence, 1973). The voluntary disclosure literature identifies two sources of 
cost that apply to this study. The management forecast literature finds a market response, 
a proxy for credibility, to good news forecasts increases when forecasts are accompanied 
by ‘verifiable forward-looking statements’ (e.g., Hirst et al., 2003; Hutton et al., 2003; 
Lundholm, 1999; Petroni, Ryan, & Wahlen, 2001; Ryan, 1997). Hutton et al. attribute the 
results to costs incurred by management who issue statements that “commit managers to 




meeting the earnings forecast in particular ways and reduces the ways in which they 
might manage earnings to achieve the forecast” (p. 870). I refer to these costs as 
‘commitment costs’ in this paper. Hutton et al. define verifiable forward-looking 
statements as those that contain quantitative components whose realizations are reported 
through financial statements (i.e., revenue forecasts). In contrast, they contend that 
qualitative statements, soft talk, lack credibility because they cannot be verified.21
 Verrecchia (1983), Verrecchia (2001), and Evans and Sridhar (2002) suggest that 
proprietary costs also lend credibility to voluntary disclosure. Proprietary costs refer to 
competitors’ use of disclosed information to erode a disclosing firm’s profits. Hayes and 
Lundholm (1996) show that there is a tradeoff in segment disclosure between informing 
the capital market about firm value and attracting competitors to abnormally profitable 
segments. Several empirical works provide evidence that management refrains from 
disclosing proprietary information. Harris (1998) finds a negative association between 
segment reporting and competitive forces (a proxy for proprietary costs). Botosan and 
Stanford (2005) and Berger and Hann (2007) use changes in segment reporting rules to 
provide evidence that firms withhold segment information in presence of proprietary 
costs. Other studies examine the association between proprietary cost and the choice to 
 I 
combine the concepts of verifiability and soft talk in this paper by measuring 
commitment costs using the disclosure of qualitative details that can be verified by 
parties external to the firm. 
                                                 
21 Hutton et al. (2003) find that soft talk disclosures are not associated with changes in firm value either 
directly or through interaction with earnings forecasts. They attribute their findings to a lack of verifiability 




disclose information in specific industry settings (e.g., Biotech: Guo, Lev, & Zhou, 2004; 
Research-intensive industries: Jones, 2007). These studies provide evidence that 
proprietary costs are an important determinant in voluntary disclosure decisions. This 
paper differs from the above literature in that it does not investigate the influence of 
proprietary costs on disclosure choice; it associates differences in future performance 
with variation in the level of proprietary information (verifiable detail) given the choice 
to disclose. 
 As mentioned earlier, Nichols (2009) investigates the interaction effect of 
proprietary cost on the market’s response to nonfinancial disclosure. This paper differs 
from Nichols’ in three ways. First, it does not use economic proxies for proprietary cost; 
such as market share, abnormal profitability, and book-to-market ratio. Nichols points out 
those economic proxies for proprietary cost may capture additional constructs associated 
with proprietary information. In contrast, this study uses the presence of verifiable 
strategy detail as a direct proxy for the level of proprietary information that management 
is willing to share. Second, this paper focuses on customer retention strategy, which 
offers theoretical and empirical predictions regarding positive future performance. 
Finally, the primary results in this study focus on variation in actual performance 
realizations, to avoid any implicit assumptions regarding ex ante market expectations 







Barrier to Entry Disclosure 
As mentioned in the introduction, a barrier to entry is defined as an incumbent 
firm’s cost advantage over potential competitors such that abnormal profits persist 
without attracting market entrants (Bain, 1956). A cost advantage (in the context of a 
BTE) is an operating cost which must be borne by market entrants that is not borne by 
incumbent firms (Stigler, 1964). A BTE can also exist between firms that compete in the 
same product-market if competitors incur costs, not borne by incumbents, to persuade 
customers to switch suppliers. Consistent with BTE theory, prior research (Baginski, 
Lorek, Willinger, & Branson, 1999; Cheng, 2005; Lev, 1983; Waring, 1996) finds barrier 
to entry variables are positively associated with the persistence of abnormal performance. 
I rely on BTE and customer retention theory to form the ex ante expectation that the 
persistence of positive abnormal performance will increase, subsequent to credible 
disclosure of customer retention strategy. 
 
Customer retention strategy involves specific actions taken to encourage 
customers to make repeat purchases from an incumbent supplier. The relationship 
marketing literature provides extensive theoretical support for expected BTE cost 
advantages associated with customer retention strategy. First, customer retention is 
expected to lead to increased customer switching costs (Hibbard et al., 2001; Morgan & 
Hunt, 1994, 1999). Customer switching costs refer to costs that a customer must incur if 
they choose to change suppliers, including costs of information-gathering and/or 




compensation for risks associated with an unprecedented purchase experience.22
Relationship marketing theory also contends that customer retention leads to 
reduced per-customer transaction costs. Customer transaction costs refer to costs a firm 
incurs to complete a transaction with a customer. For example, a firm can incur 
marketing/promotion expense in making customers aware of and creating incentives to 
purchase its products. Transaction cost investments are expected to become more 
efficient relative to potential competitors (creating a BTE cost advantage) as customer 
retention increases because firms can leverage knowledge and awareness gleaned from a 
long transaction history (Reichheld & Sasser, 1990; Srivastava, Shervani, & Fahey, 
1998).
 
Competitors must entice customers with incentives to offset customer switching costs. 
Subsequently, relationship marketing theory suggests that long-term customer 







                                                 
22 Sources of equivalent information may include product reviews, consumer reports, word-of-mouth 
inquiries, and initial purchases. Compensation for switching costs may also include price and promotion 
incentives. 
23 There is anecdotal evidence in addition to theoretical support suggesting that customer retention is 
associated with reduced customer transaction costs. For example, Pinnacle Entertainment, Inc. reports in 
their 2005 10-K, “We anticipate such [marketing and promotional] costs declining in the future. Generally, 
the cost to retain customers is less expensive than attracting new customers” (p. 33). Additionally, The 
Allstate Corporation reports in their 2003 10-K, “As is true for the industry in general, costs attributable to 
our personal property and casualty products are generally higher during the first year an insurance policy is 
in effect than in subsequent years…. Policies become more profitable over time. Accordingly, customer 
retention is an important factor in the segment’s profitability and a key element of our strategy in this 




 I use two samples of firms that disclose customer retention strategy in this paper. 
The first sample of firms discloses a change in customer retention strategy (change firms) 
while the second sample discloses an ongoing customer retention strategy (ongoing 
firms). Both samples are dichotomously subdivided based on whether or not they provide 
verifiable detail in their disclosure. In combination, the samples provide extensive 
variation in the credibility of firms that have chosen to disclose strategy. 
Hypotheses 
 A change in customer retention strategy represents management’s effort to create 
a cost advantage over potential competitors. Change firms that are willing to incur 
commitment and risk proprietary costs by making the market aware of a customer 
retention strategy before its cost advantages have been established, provide credible 
information about expected future performance. By disclosing verifiable details, change 
firm management incurs commitment costs associated with an implicit contract to invest 
resources and risks proprietary costs by revealing strategy before it has been 
implemented. If potential competitors believe that the change in strategy is credible, then 
they will either: 1) enter the market with a counter-strategy to preempt the cost 
advantage, or 2) choose not to enter the market because they believe that the incumbent 
will achieve its cost advantage regardless of counter-strategy. By providing verifiable 
detail, management signals that they believe that competitors will respond by choosing 




persistence of positive abnormal performance.24
 
 
H3.1: Firms that disclose a change in customer retention strategy using 
verifiable detail have a greater change in the persistence of positive abnormal 
performance than firms that disclose a change in customer retention strategy 
without verifiable detail. 
 
 The ongoing firm sample represents a group of managers who choose to disclose 
information about an existing strategy.25 Similar to change firms, management can 
provide information about expected future performance by incurring commitment and 
risking proprietary costs. Management incurs commitment costs by revealing verifiable 
detail about a strategy for which they can now be held responsible.26
                                                 
24 The 10-K disclosure provides a proxy for management’s willingness to share information through an 
overall disclosure strategy. Management may disclose strategic information through a portfolio of media, 
including press releases, conference calls, and/or Securities and Exchange Commission filings. 
 Additionally, 
verifiable detail lends credibility by providing proprietary information to competitors. If 
potential competitors are made aware of an ongoing customer retention strategy, then 
they will either: 1) use the disclosed information to form a counter-strategy, eroding any 
cost advantage, or 2) choose not to enter the market because they believe that the 
incumbent’s cost advantage offsets the benefit of pursuing abnormal profits. By 
providing verifiable detail, management signals that they believe that competitors will 
25 This paper assumes that the barrier has already been established at the time of the ongoing strategy 
disclosure. However, it is possible that management discloses the strategy after the strategy has been 
implemented but before the full economic effects of the barrier have been realized. In this case, the 
difference between the samples is diminished, biasing against results for hypothesis 3.3. 
26 This assumes that the strategy was not transparent to external stakeholders prior to the disclosure. If the 




respond by choosing not to enter the market. Deterred competitive entry further 
establishes the BTE, increasing the persistence of positive abnormal performance. In 
contrast, if potential competitors are unaware of a firm’s customer retention strategy then 
they will continue to enter the market in pursuit of abnormal profits.27
 
 Unlike change 
firms, the ongoing strategy has presumably already yielded a cost advantage; therefore, 
changes in performance can be associated with the disclosure effect of dissuading 
potential competitors from entering the market. 
H3.2: Firms that disclose an ongoing customer retention strategy using 
verifiable detail increase the persistence of positive abnormal performance 
relative to firms that disclose an ongoing customer retention strategy without 
verifiable detail. 
 
 Finally, credible change firms differ from credible ongoing firms in two ways. 
First, it is possible that credible change firms would have increased performance whether 
or not they disclosed the change in strategy.28
                                                 
27 This statement assumes that potential competitors cannot directly observe firms’ cost advantage. That is, 
competitors do not attribute abnormal performance to a BTE cost advantage such as relationship-based 
customer switching costs. 
 Conversely, credible ongoing firms 
presumably have already established a cost advantage at the time of the disclosure. 
Second, change firms risk greater proprietary costs than ongoing firms because the BTE 
cost advantage for change firms has not yet been established. Competitors of change 
firms have an opportunity to use the disclosed proprietary information to preempt the 
28 The change in strategy may be in response to poor performance and/or adverse market conditions. 
Therefore, the “increase” in performance is relative to expected performance without credible disclosure, 




change in strategy whereas competitors of ongoing firms can only react to an existing 
strategy. If change firms are willing to risk greater proprietary costs than ongoing firms 
then they must expect greater performance improvements associated with disclosure. 
These differences lead to a third hypothesis that the improvement in future performance 
for change firms exceeds that of ongoing firms given that both groups disclose verifiable 
detail. 
 
H3.3: Firms that disclose a change in customer retention strategy using 
verifiable detail have a greater increase in the persistence of positive 
abnormal performance than firms that disclose an ongoing customer 
retention strategy using verifiable detail. 
 
Sample Selection 
Sample Selection and Research Design 
 Table 3.1 numerically describes the sample selection process. The sample initially 
includes all firms with available data in Compustat from 1994 through 2008. The sample 
period begins in 1994 due to the availability of online 10-K filings for collection of 
disclosure information. Firms in regulated industries are excluded due to potentially 
confounding effects of regulation on customer retention strategy and performance.29
                                                 
29 Regulated industries include Utilities (4-digit NAICS 2211-2213) and Telecommunications (5131-5133, 
5151-5152, 5171-5179) firms. 
 The 
sample is further reduced by searching 10-K filings for firms that disclose customer 







Reduction Firms Firm-years 
  Economy (1994 – 2008)   18,334   156,328 
No regulated industries1    (1,193)   (10,556) 
  Subtotal unregulated Economy   17,141   145,772 
Missing, zero or negative Sales and Cost of Goods Sold; 
missing Earnings before Interest and Taxes; Missing 
Market Value 
   (3,213)    (39,013) 
  Available Data   13,928   106,759 
No reference to key words  (12,891)    (96,575) 
  Reference to key words     1,037     10,184 
Fewer than 7 observations, at least 2 years 
preceding/following disclosure2 
      (484)      (3,643) 
  Total available key word sample        553       6,541 
Nonstrategic key word references       (437)      (5,193) 
  Total referencing customer retention strategy        116       1,348 
Outliers3         (18)         (189) 
  Total Sample          98       1,159 
   
    Subsample: Verifiable change in customer retention 
strategy 
         18          217 
    Subsample: Nonverifiable change in customer retention 
strategy 
         23          285 
    Subsample: Verifiable ongoing customer retention 
strategy 
         15          164 
    Subsample: Nonverifiable ongoing customer retention 
strategy 
         42          493 
   
  Total Sample Firm-years limited to 4 preceding and 4 
subsequent to disclosure yearc 
         98          766 
    Subsample: Verifiable change in customer retention 
strategy 
         18          141 
    Subsample: Nonverifiable change in customer retention 
strategy 
         23          185 
    Subsample: Verifiable ongoing customer retention 
strategy 
         15          118 
    Subsample: Nonverifiable ongoing customer retention 
strategy 





Table 3.1 (continued) 
1 This paper removes the Utilities (4-digit NAICS 2211–2213) and Telecommunications (5131–5133, 
5151–5152, 5171–5179) industries where competition is likely to be influenced by regulation. For 
example, Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regulation allows customers to keep phone 
numbers when changing service providers, significantly changing customers’ switching costs. Quoting 
the most recent FCC press release, “Delays in number porting cost consumers money and impede their 
ability to choose providers based solely on price, quality and service (2009).” 
2 Firms with missing observations within the 7-year window around the disclosure (+/- 2 years) are 
dropped. The earliest observation is lost due to the auto-regressive nature of the hypothesis tests. 
3 Outliers:
Detailed descriptions of dropped firms/observations follow: 
 Firms with influential observations were identified using studentized residuals greater than 
three or less than –3. Each firm is examined to determine whether influential observations are associated 
with changes in performance unrelated to the disclosed customer retention strategy. All firm observations 
(influential or otherwise) are dropped if the firm’s influential observations are not clearly associated with 
the disclosed customer retention strategy and the observation is within a 2-year window around the 
disclosure year. Individual influential firm-year observations are dropped (as opposed to all firm 
observations) in cases where the observations fall outside of the 2-year window around the disclosure 
year. 
• Meditrust merged with La Quinta in 1998 (2 years prior to the disclosure year) substantially 
changing the firm’s cost structure. All observations are dropped. 
• Prior to 1997 (2 years prior to the disclosure year), Illinois Superconductor Corporation provided a 
large proportion of its R&D investment based on government contracts. After 1997, the government 
contracts were terminated substantially changing the firm’s cost structure. All observations are 
dropped. 
• In 2007 and 2008 (3-4 years subsequent to disclosure), Hanmi Financial incurred substantial (~30% 
of revenue) impairment expenses associated with Goodwill. 2007 and 2008 firm-year observations 
are dropped. 
• In 2006 (2 years subsequent to disclosure), AXS-One discontinued its Enterprise Solutions product 
line substantially decreasing revenue (~65% decrease). All observations are dropped. 
• youbet.com was in start-up phase during the 3 years leading up to the disclosure year. First revenue 
appeared part-way through 1998. During this same time, youbet.com incurred substantial start-up 
operating expenses (370% - 4300% of revenue). All observations are dropped. 
• Prior to 2001 (2 years prior to disclosure), Stage Stores restructured as part of Chapter 11 
Bankruptcy. Observations prior to 2001 (3-4 years prior to disclosure) are dropped. 
• iLinc Communications discontinued its dental practice software suite in 2003 (the disclosure year), 
significantly influencing revenue and cost structure. All observations are dropped. 
• VA Software discontinued its Professional Services and Linux software engineering divisions in 
fiscal 2002 (2 years prior to disclosure) due to economy-driven poor operating performance, 
significantly influencing revenue and cost structure. All observations are dropped. 
• In 1999 (2 years prior to disclosure), Safeguard Health Enterprises recorded an unusually large asset 
impairment disproportionately inflating general and administrative expense. All observations are 
dropped. 
• In 1998 (4 years prior to disclosure), Matria Healthcare performed the significant acquisition of 
Quality Diagnostic Services. In 2004 (2 years subsequent to disclosure), they discontinued the direct-
to-consumer pharmacy and supplies division decreasing approximately2/3rds of its revenue. All 









Table 3.1 (continued) 
3 Outliers:
• In 2000 (one year subsequent to disclosure), ECCS lost a substantial portion (~80%) of government 
contract revenue due to a federal investigation into Air Force purchasing. All observations are 
dropped. 
 (Continued) 
• In 2005 (2 years subsequent to disclosure), Mediabay lost a substantial portion (~40%) of 
subscription revenue due to a change in renewal policy from auto-renewal to customer-initiated 
renewals. Note: This verifiable change in strategy is not explicitly described in the nonverifiable 
customer retention disclosure 2 years prior. The results (if the firm is included in the sample) would 
imply that nonverifiable firms are associated with poor future performance relative to verifiable 
firms. However, the results are explicitly confounded by a subsequent change in customer-related 
strategy. All observations are dropped. 
• In 2001 (2 years prior to disclosure), Onvia discontinued its low-margin business-to-business 
segment. All Onvia observations are dropped. 
• In 1999 and 2000 (3 and 2 years prior to disclosure), Precision Auto Care recorded an unusually 
large amount of bad debt expense and litigation expense disproportionately inflating general and 
administrative expense. All observations are dropped. 
• In 2005 (2 years subsequent to disclosure), Prologis underwent a substantial acquisition (>100% 
increase in revenue) of Catellus. All observations are dropped. 
• In 1999 (thee years prior to disclosure), A.D.A.M. added an internet segment substantially changing 
is cost model. Observations prior to and including 1999 are dropped. 
• In 2005, (2 years subsequent to disclosure), GS Financial recorded a substantial (~50% if revenue) 
provision for loan losses associated with Hurricane Katrina. All observations are dropped. 
• In 2001, (the disclosure year), Gametech International recorded a substantial (5% of revenue) 
onetime charge for the launch of a new product. All observations are dropped. 
• In 2001 and 2002 (2-3 years prior to disclosure), Bottomline Technologies recorded substantial (40-
45% of revenue) impairment expenses associated with intangible assets. All observations are 
dropped. 
• In 2002 (2 years prior to disclosure), Intraware established a strategic relationship with iPlanet E-









“customer retention,” “retain customer,” and “relationship marketing.” Each filing 
containing one or more word strings is read in detail to determine whether the disclosure 
references customer retention strategy; and further subcategorized based on whether it 
describes a change, in or an ongoing strategy. A selection of excerpts from disclosures 
and justification for coding from each subsample is included in the Appendix.30
 Earnings persistence is estimated using an autoregressive model, so each firm is 
required to have at least seven firm-year observations, with at least two preceding and 
two subsequent to the disclosure year. The 7-year requirement may bias the sample 
towards surviving firms. However, it is requisite to ensure statistical power to identify 
postdisclosure change in earnings persistence relative to predisclosure performance. 
 Several 
firms issue multiple disclosures during the sample period that include a word string. In 
these cases, the first chronological occurrence is classified as the disclosure year. This is 
done to provide a predisclosure baseline free of customer retention strategy changes. 
Table 3.2 provides a detailed breakdown of industry and disclosure year timing. 
 Firms with influential observations are evaluated to determine whether the 
economics explicitly relate to the disclosed customer retention strategy.31
                                                 
30 Coding justification for the remaining firms is available upon request from author. 
 This is done 
through examination of the management discussion relating to observations’ financial 
performance. If the influential observations fall within a plus/minus 2-year window 
around the disclosure and do not explicitly relate to customer retention strategy, then all 
observations for the firm are dropped. If the influential observations fall 3- to 4-years
31 Influential observations are identified using studentized residuals whose absolute value is greater than 
three. Residuals are collected from estimating each subsample’s abnormal ROS equation 3.2. 
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Table 3.2 
Number of Customer Retention Strategy Disclosures by Year and Industry 
N=98 Firms Disclosure Year1 
 





















           
23 – Construction      3    3 
31-33 – Manufacturing  2  1  3 3 1 2 12 
42 – Wholesale Trade      2 1 2  5 
44-45 – Retail Trade 2 1 2   3 5   13 
48 – Transportation and Warehousing     1 1    2 
51 – Information   1  2 1 1   5 
52 – Finance and Insurance 1 2 1 3 4 14 5 5 2 37 
53 – Real Estate, Rental and Leasing      1    1 
54 – Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services      4    4 
56 – Administrative and Support, Waste Management, and 
Remediation Services 
 1    2  1 2 6 
61 – Educational Services         1 1 
62 – Health Care and Social Assistance     1 1    2 
71 – Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation  1    1   1 3 
81 – Other Services    1   1   2 
99 – Unclassified      1 1   2 
           
Total # of Firms 3 7 4 5 8 37 17 9 8 98 
NAICS Industry codes and descriptions taken from the 2007 updated North American Industry Classification System. 
Disclosure Years reference firm fiscal years. 






prior to or subsequent to disclosure and do not explicitly relate to customer retention 
strategy, then only the observations outside of the 2-year window around disclosure are 
dropped. Of the 116 firms identified as disclosing customer retention strategy, 18 firms 
are dropped due to noncustomer retention strategy-related firms are dropped due to 
noncustomer retention strategy-related influential observations. Details regarding the 
dropped observations are included in the footnotes to Table 3.1. 
 Finally, each firm that discloses customer retention strategy is classified 
according to whether it provides verifiable detail. This paper uses a binary coding method 
for assessing the levels associated with each disclosure. Disclosure is classified as having 
verifiable detail if it contains statements that describe the nature of the change in strategy 
and the change can be verified by a constituent external to the firm (e.g., investor, 
competitor). For example, a disclosure that states “the Company’s strategy is to grow the 
business through improved customer retention” does not provide sufficient descriptive 
information to be coded as containing verifiable detail. In contrast, a disclosure that 
states, “the Company is currently beginning the chain wide rollout of its new relationship 
marketing program, the Customer Appreciation Card” does provide sufficient detail that 
can be verified by observing card-carrying customers. Finally, a disclosure that states 
“the Company believes the implementation of the customer tracking system will help us 
retain customers. We use our research data to tailor promotional offers to the specific 
tastes of targeted customers” does provide detail regarding the strategic change. 
Conversely, the existence of the customer-profiling database cannot be verified by 





 The final sample is comprised of 98 firms. Forty-one firms disclose a change in 
strategy (18 provide verifiable detail, 23 do not). Fifty-seven firms disclose an ongoing 
strategy (15 provide verifiable detail, 42 do not). The analysis discussed in the following 
sections uses no more than 9 firm-years per firm (4 years prior to and subsequent to 
disclosure). The constrained time horizon is used to minimize confounding effects 
associated with other (nonBTE related) changes in strategy but still provide adequate 





Variable Definition and Descriptive Statistics 
 As discussed previously, customer retention is associated with persistent positive 
abnormal performance due to increased customer switching costs (Hibbard et al., 2001; 
Morgan & Hunt, 1994, 1999) and lower customer transaction costs (Reichheld & Sasser, 
1990; Srivastava et al., 1998). This paper uses three measures of abnormal performance 
designed to separate price premiums due to customer switching costs from customer 
transaction cost advantages. Abnormal performance is measured by return on sales 
(earnings before interest and taxes divided by net revenue), gross margin (1–cost of 
goods sold divided by net revenue), and selling, general and administrative margin (1–
Performance Variables 
                                                 
32 Examples are based on the 2002 10-K for Matria Healthcare, Inc; 2000 10-K for Caremark Corp; and 
2003 10-K for Riviera Holdings Corp. Wording is adapted for illustration. 




selling, general, and administrative expense divided by net revenue).34,35
Each performance variable is measured relative to its closest competitor by 
matching firms based on 4-digit NAICS industry, the natural log of market value of 
equity (firm size), and predisclosure performance.
 Abnormal return 
on sales (ROS) accounts for sales relative to all operational costs; capturing price 
premiums, customer transaction cost efficiencies, and any other production/purchasing 
and SGA efficiencies. Abnormal gross margin (GM) accounts for sales relative to cost of 
goods sold; capturing price premiums and production/purchasing efficiencies, without 
capturing customer transaction cost or other SGA efficiencies. Lastly, selling, general and 
administrative margin (SGA Margin) captures price premiums, customer transaction cost 
efficiencies, and other SGA efficiencies without capturing production/purchasing 
efficiencies. 
36,37
                                                 
34 Previous cost accounting literature (e.g., Abarbanell & Bushee, 1997; Anderson, Banker, Huang, & 
Janakiraman, 2007; Anderson, Banker, & Janakiraman, 2003) has used a similar measure of efficiency, the 
SGA cost ratio (selling, general and administrative expense divided by net revenue). 
 This design is used in lieu of 
industry-adjusted performance because it accounts for within-industry differences in 
profitability that are not indicative of economic performance. To illustrate, a large firm 
may have an abnormally large proportion of industry profits while its ROS falls below 
the industry mean. Matching on size resolves this issue. Similarly, there may be 
35 Selling, general, and administrative expense is defined as all costs included in earnings before interest 
and taxes (EBIT) except cost of goods sold. This definition is used so that all EBIT cost components are 
included in either the GM or SGA Margin measures. 
36 In 1997, the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) was adopted to replace Standard 
Industry Classifications (SIC). NAICS definitions offer a cohesive, up-to-date industry definition (Krishnan 
& Press, 2004). 
37 Comparator firms are examined for unusual postdisclosure activity (such as acquisitions/dispositions that 
significantly alter performance). The next best match is selected when a comparator is found to have 




substantial diversity in COGS and SGA investment mix within an industry, resulting in 
mis-leading interpretations of industry-adjusted GM and SGA Margin. Matching on 
predisclosure GM and SGA Margin performance mitigates this problem. Matching on 
industry controls for temporal effects on profitability (assumed to be constant across 
similarly-sized firms within an industry). 
Table 3.3 Panel A provides descriptive statistics for the variables used in the 
primary analysis. None of the mean abnormal performance measures are significantly 
different than zero. This is likely due to the predisclosure performance (GM and SGA 
Margin) matching criteria used to identify benchmark firms. The performance measures’ 
standard deviations for the verifiable detail subsamples are lower than the standard 
deviations for the nonverifiable subsamples. This is consistent with the verifiable detail 
subsamples having greater persistence than the nonverifiable detail subsamples. 
Table 3.3 Panel B provides average abnormal performance for each year 
beginning 4 years prior through 4 years subsequent to the disclosure year. The verifiable 
change and ongoing firms’ abnormal performance appears to increase (albeit statistically 
insignificantly) slightly from before to after the disclosure year across all performance 
measures except GM (ongoing firms). In contrast, the nonverifiable change firms’ 
abnormal GM becomes significantly positive (p<0.05, p<0.10) in the last couple of years, 
offset by significantly negative (p<0.05, p<0.05) SGA Margin. The nonverifiable 
ongoing firms’ abnormal SGA Margin becomes significantly negative (p<0.10, p<0.05) 
without any offsetting increase in performance in GM. 
Table 3.3 Panel C reports Pearson and Spearman correlations among variables. 
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Table 3.3 
Descriptive Statistics for Firms that Disclose Customer Retention Strategy 
Panel A – Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Samples # Firms Mean Median 1st Quartile 3rd Quartile Std Deviation 
Performance Variables 
Abnormal Return on 
Sales 
Total Sample 98 (0.4%) (0.0%)   (3.6%) 2.3%   7 points 
       
Subsamples:       
Verifiable Change 18 (0.4%)  0.2%   (3.6%) 2.6%   4 points 
Nonverifiable Change 23  0.3%  0.6%   (3.3%) 5.1%   9 points 
Verifiable Ongoing 15 (1.2%) (1.3%)   (3.8%) 0.7%   7 points 
Nonverifiable Ongoing 42 (0.6%) (0.1%)   (3.9%) 2.3%   8 points 
Abnormal Gross 
Margin 
Total Sample 98  1.0%  0.0%   (2.9%) 5.0% 11 points 
       
Subsamples:       
Verifiable Change 18  0.4%  0.2%   (4.3%) 6.2%   6 points 
Nonverifiable Change 23  1.2%  1.5%   (2.1%) 6.4% 15 points 
Verifiable Ongoing 15 (0.8%) (0.8%)   (2.9%) 0.9%   6 points 





Total Sample 98 (1.4%) (0.1%)   (3.5%) 1.7% 11 points 
       
Subsamples:       
Verifiable Change 18 (0.9%) (0.4%)   (4.5%) 2.5%   7 points 
Nonverifiable Change 23 (0.9%) (1.1%)   (7.8%) 1.7% 11 points 
Verifiable Ongoing 15 (0.5%)  0.4%   (2.0%) 1.3%   3 points 
Nonverifiable Ongoing 42 (2.2%)  0.0%   (3.7%) 2.3% 14 points 
Control Variables 
Market Share (%) Total Sample 98 6.7% 0.7% 0.0% 6.4% 14 points 
       
Subsamples:       
Verifiable Change 18 8.6% 2.0% 0.0% 9.6% 13 points 
Nonverifiable Change 23 5.5% 1.0% 0.3% 3.3% 15 points 
Verifiable Ongoing 15 4.5% 0.8% 0.1% 9.1%   7 points 
Nonverifiable Ongoing 42 7.4% 0.3% 0.0% 5.3% 17 points 
 
  95 
Table 3.3 (Continued) 
Panel A – Descriptive Statistics (Continued) 





Total Sample 98 21.0 16.9   6.4 25.9 16.5 
       
Subsamples:       
Verifiable Change 18 19.3 16.5 10.2 26.2 11.0 
Nonverifiable Change 23 19.3 17.5   6.4 24.7 13.3 
Verifiable Ongoing 15 25.2 20.2 14.2 29.7 16.3 
Nonverifiable Ongoing 42 21.1 16.3   6.4 24.4 20.0 
Number of Firms in 
NAICS4 Industry 
Total Sample 98 249   65 25 615 289 
       
Subsamples:       
Verifiable Change 18 212   56 27 277 282 
Nonverifiable Change 23 227   54 35 512 276 
Verifiable Ongoing 15 155   46 19 208 236 




Total Sample 98 0.36 0.29 0.11 0.56 0.32 
       
Subsamples:       
Verifiable Change 18 0.45 0.38 0.22 0.78 0.32 
Nonverifiable Change 23 0.35 0.38 0.11 0.56 0.27 
Verifiable Ongoing 15 0.32 0.14 0.11 0.50 0.34 
Nonverifiable Ongoing 42 0.33 0.24 0.00 0.56 0.35 
Matching Variable 
Market Value of 
Equity ($ mils) 
Total Sample 98   4,786 419   72 2,663 18,836 
       
Subsamples:       
Verifiable Change 18   5,121 610 125 4,916   8,881 
Nonverifiable Change 23   5,622 793   70 6,751 10,710 
Verifiable Ongoing 15 12,226 405   51    896 45,440 
Nonverifiable Ongoing 42   1,527 330   68 2,087   2,923 
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Table 3.3 (Continued) 
Panel B – Mean Values by Year 
Variable  4 yrs prior 3 yrs prior 2 yrs prior 1 yr prior Disclosure yr 1 yr after 2 yrs after 3 yrs after 4 yrs after 
Performance Variables 
# of Firms Total Sample 79a 91b 98 98 98 98 98 76c 57d,e 
Subsamples:          
Verifiable Change 13 15 18 18 18 18 18 15 13 
Nonverifiable Change 19 20 23 23 23 23 23 21 17 
Verifiable Ongoing 12 15 15 15 15 15 15 12 9 
Nonverifiable Ongoing 35a 41 42 42 42 42 42 28 18 
Mean Abnormal 
Return on Sales 
Total Sample  0.8% (1.2%) (0.3%)  0.8%  0.4% (1.2%) (1.5%) (0.6%) (0.8%) 
Subsamples:          
Verifiable Change  0.6% (2.2%) (0.8%) (1.1%) (0.8%)  0.6%  0.7%  0.4% (0.2%) 
Nonverifiable Change  1.6%  2.6% (0.1%)  0.1%  0.6% (1.6%) (0.6%)  1.5% (0.6%) 
Verifiable Ongoing  2.0% (5.2%) (3.0%) (0.5%) (1.4%) (1.3%)  0.0% (1.4%)  2.5% 
Nonverifiable Ongoing (0.1%) (1.2%)  0.6%  2.4%  1.6% (1.8%) (3.4%) (2.4%) (3.1%) 
Mean Abnormal 
Gross Margin 
Total Sample (0.3%) (0.1%)  1.2%  1.5%  0.6%  0.6%  1.3%  2.3%‡  2.1% 
Subsamples:          
Verifiable Change  0.1% (0.9%)  1.2% (0.3%) (0.1%)  0.7%  0.5%  0.5% (0.5%) 
Nonverifiable Change (2.4%) (0.0%) (1.6%) (0.2%)  0.5%  2.2%  3.4%  7.2%*  6.0%‡ 
Verifiable Ongoing  1.8% (1.9%)‡ (0.1%) (0.9%) (0.5%) (1.4%) (0.6%) (2.2%) (0.1%) 






Total Sample  1.1% (1.1%) (1.6%) (0.7%) (0.2%) (1.8%) (2.8%) (2.9%)* (2.9%)* 
Subsamples:          
Verifiable Change  0.5% (1.3%) (2.0%) (0.8%) (0.7%) (0.1%)  0.2% (0.2%)  0.3% 
Nonverifiable Change  4.0%  2.7%  1.6%  0.3%  0.1% (3.8%) (4.0%) (5.7%)* (6.6%)* 
Verifiable Ongoing  0.2% (3.3%) (2.9%)  0.3% (0.9%)  0.1%  0.6%  0.8%  2.7% 




Total Sample 6.1% 6.8% 7.2% 7.1% 7.1% 7.2% 7.2%   6.5% 6.9% 
Subsamples:          
Verifiable Change 9.3% 9.0% 8.4% 8.7% 9.0% 9.4% 9.4% 11.4% 12.7% 
Nonverifiable Change 4.4% 4.1% 6.8% 6.7% 6.7% 6.7% 6.9%   2.0%   2.4% 
Verifiable Ongoing 5.0% 4.7% 4.5% 4.3% 4.3% 4.1% 5.0%   3.5%   4.6% 
Nonverifiable Ongoing 6.3% 8.1% 7.8% 7.7% 7.5% 7.5% 7.3%   8.4%   8.0% 
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Table 3.3 (Continued) 
Panel B – Mean Values by Year (Continued) 





Total Sample 24.1 22.3 21.2 20.9 20.2 19.5 18.4 16.8 15.8 
Subsamples:          
Verifiable Change 25.2 21.2 20.2 19.4 18.0 17.9 16.8 17.3 15.7 
Nonverifiable Change 23.2 22.4 19.5 18.5 18.9 17.5 16.2 14.4 13.4 
Verifiable Ongoing 27.6 26.5 26.5 25.2 23.5 23.2 21.3 18.6 15.4 
Nonverifiable Ongoing 23.0 21.2 20.7 21.4 20.6 20.6 19.3 17.6 18.4 
Mean Number of 
Firms in NAICS4 
Industry 
Total Sample 214 247 256 261 264 258 244 213 207 
Subsamples:          
Verifiable Change 163 245 215 219 217 216 206 142 128 
Nonverifiable Change 188 199 228 238 250 243 233 243 250 
Verifiable Ongoing 157 158 158 160 162 160 150 119 136 




Total Sample 0.39 0.36 0.29 0.32 0.45 0.44 0.40 0.36 0.39 
Subsamples:          
Verifiable Change 0.54 0.47 0.33 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.61 0.53 0.54 
Nonverifiable Change 0.32 0.40 0.35 0.26 0.30 0.52 0.43 0.33 0.35 
Verifiable Ongoing 0.42 0.40 0.33 0.27 0.40 0.33 0.27 0.25 0.33 
Nonverifiable Ongoing 0.37 0.29 0.21 0.29 0.52 0.36 0.33 0.32 0.33 
Matching Variable 
Market Value of 
Equity ($ mils) 
Total Sample 2,989 3,576   4,285 5,427   6,108   5,580   6,576 8,951 10,394 
Subsamples:          
Verifiable Change 4,153 3,565   3,850   3,671   5,144   6,248   7,102 13,276 11,791 
Nonverifiable Change 4,167 5,807   4,599   5,981   6,605   6,386   7,518   7,978   9,300 
Verifiable Ongoing 5,340 7,710 12,813 17,443 17,898 12,747 17,665 21,630 27,591 
Nonverifiable Ongoing 1,112    979   1,254   1,585   2,039   2,294   1,875   1,928   1,819 
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Table 3.3 (Continued) 
Panel C – Pearson (Spearman) correlation on the upper (lower) diagonal 












Abnormal Return on Sales (ROS)    0.299 
  *** 
  0.476 
  *** 
  0.049 –0.001 –0.005 –0.023   0.104 
  ** 
Abnormal Gross Margin (GM)   0.469 
  *** 
 –0.697 
  *** 
–0.255 
  *** 
–0.046   0.021   0.031 –0.008 
Abnormal Selling, General, and 
Administrative Margin (SGA Margin) 
  0.334 
  *** 
–0.531 
  *** 
   0.271 
  *** 
  0.042 –0.024 –0.045   0.086 
  * 
Market Share   0.115 
  ** 
–0.051   0.125 
  *** 
   0.485 
  *** 
–0.349 
  *** 
  0.326 
  *** 
  0.234 
  *** 
Herfindahl Index   0.031   0.009   0.003   0.631 
  *** 
 –0.579 
  *** 
  0.244 
  *** 
–0.045 
# of Firms in Industry –0.004   0.030 –0.019 –0.795 
  *** 
–0.806 
  *** 
 –0.299 
  *** 
–0.044 
  
Acquisition Indicator Variable   0.001   0.043 
  
–0.082 
  * 
  0.392 
  *** 
  0.322 
  *** 
–0.340 
  *** 
   0.226 
  *** 
Market Value of Equity   0.105 
  ** 
–0.013 
  
  0.048 
 
  0.479 





  0.222 
  *** 
 
Variable Definitions (Calculations using Compustat data items in brackets): 
Abnormal Return on Sales Return on Sales [ebit/revt] adjusted by Return on Sales from a 4-digit NAICS industry [naics] peer matched on 
the average standardized log of market value of equity, Gross Margin, and Selling, General, and Administrative 
Margin for the 4 years prior to the disclosure year. 
Abnormal Gross Margin Gross Margin [1 – cogs/revt] adjusted by Gross Margin from a 4-digit NAICS industry [naics] peer matched on 
the average standardized log of market value of equity, Gross Margin, and Selling, General, and Administrative 
Margin for the 4 years prior to the disclosure year. 
Abnormal Selling, General, and 
Administrative Margin 
Selling, General, and Administrative (SGA) Margin [(ebit + cogs)/revt] adjusted by SGA Margin from a 4-digit 
NAICS industry [naics] peer matched on average standardized log of market value of equity, Gross Margin, and 
SGA Margin for the 4 years prior to the disclosure year. 
Market Value The natural log of market value [mvalt] at the end of the fiscal period. 





Table 3.3 (Continued) 
Variable Definitions (Calculations using Compustat data items in brackets) (Continued): 











where Mktshri,t is Market Share, defined above, and Nj,t is the total number of firms in industry j at time t reported 
by Compustat that have revenue [revt] greater than 0. 
Number of Firms in NAICS4 Industry Number of Firms in the 4-digit NAICS industry [naics] assigned by firm-year as measured by Nj,t above. 
Acquisition Indicator Variable Acquisition indicator variable set to 1 if acquisition expense [aqc] does not equal 0 by firm-year. 
Market Share Firm revenue [revt] divided by 4-digit NAICS [naics] industry revenue by firm-year. 









Abnormal ROS is positively correlated with both GM and SGA Margin (p<0.001, 
p<0.01). Abnormal GM and SGA Margin are negatively correlated (p<0.001), indicating 
a tradeoff between GM and SGA Margin efficiencies. 
 
Four control variables are included to account for factors that influence abnormal 
performance that are unrelated to the disclosed customer retention strategy: market share, 




Industry concentration (Herfi,t-1) and the number of firms within each firm’s 
industry (IndustryFirmsi,t-1) provide proxies for rivalry. Industry concentration captures 
rivalry between large and small firms within a market. Prior literature documents a 
positive relationship between industry concentration and abnormal performance; 
indicative of imperfect competition and/or efficiency advantages. The number of firms 
within an industry captures overall industry rivalry, found to be negatively associated 
 Recent literature has used market share (Mktshri,t-1) as a proxy for a barrier to 
entry, finding a positive association with abnormal performance (Cheng, 2005). 
Alternatively, it is possible that firms may pursue a low-price strategy to acquire and 
maintain market share, leading to a negative association between market share and 
abnormal performance (Brewer, Garrison, & Noreen, 2007). This paper expects market 
share, as a proxy for a BTE, to be positively associated with abnormal performance. 
                                                 
38 It is likely that customer retention strategy is, in part, related to firm size, market share, market 
concentration, and acquisition activity. However, the control variables are designed to capture past and 
present barriers to entry erring on the side of capturing some of the change in customer retention strategy 




with abnormal performance (Waring, 1996). All industry measures refer to 4-digit 
NAICS classification. 
An indicator variable (Acqi,t), set to 1 if a firm reports acquisition expense and 0 
otherwise, is included to capture the association between acquisition activity and 
abnormal performance. There is some evidence that acquisitions result in improved 
performance (Fowler & Schmidt, 1989) under certain conditions (firms have acquisition 
experience; target firm does not contest acquisition, etc.). Other evidence suggests that 
expected performance (measured by market reaction) declines with acquisition (Agrawal, 
Jaffe, & Mandelker, 1992). Therefore, the coefficient carries no directional prediction. 
Table 3.3 Panel A reports descriptive statistics for the control variables. Variation 
in market share between verifiable detail subsamples provides confidence that results are 
not driven by factors associated with market power. The verifiable detail subsamples for 
change firms and ongoing firms have the largest (8.6%) and smallest (4.5%) market 
shares out of all four subsamples. Yet both verifiable detail subsamples have greater 
increases in performance than the nonverifiable detail subsamples. This implies that 
market share does not drive results. Both measures of market concentration are similar 
for the change firm subsamples. This provides confidence that differences in market 
concentration do not explain the difference in performance trends between verifiable and 
nonverifiable detail change firms. 
Table 3.3 Panel B provides average control variable measures for each year 
beginning 4 years prior, through 4 years subsequent to the disclosure year. Market share, 




consistent pattern for any of the subsamples over the sample period. Market 
concentration (as measured by the Herfindahl index) monotonically decreases for all of 
the subsamples with the exception of the nonverifiable detail ongoing firm subsample. 
This is indicative of a steadily increasing competitive environment over time. 
Table 3.3 Panel C reports the Pearson and Spearman correlations among 
variables. Market share is positively correlated with abnormal ROS and SGA Margin, 
consistent with size-related efficiencies (Cheng, 2005; Waring, 1996). Market share is 
negatively correlated with abnormal GM, consistent with the use of prices (thinning GM) 
to maintain market share (Brewer et al., 2007). Neither measure of industry concentration 
(Herfindahl and number of firms) is correlated with any of the abnormal performance 
measures, likely because it is calculated using industry peers as a benchmark. Market 
value of equity is correlated with abnormal ROS and SGA Margin. However, in 
untabulated analysis, market value is uncorrelated with abnormal ROS and SGA Margin 
except when using observations from the period subsequent to disclosure for firms that 
provide verifiable detail (p<0.001). This is consistent with an increase in expected 
performance associated with the credible disclosure of customer retention strategy 
relative to matched industry peers. 
 
Research Design 
The association between nonfinancial disclosure and change in persistence of 
positive abnormal performance uses regression analysis similar to that used by Harris 




entering the product-market (Stigler, 1964), increasing the persistence of positive 
abnormal performance. However, potential competitors do not have the same incentive to 
enter the market if the incumbent is incurring negative abnormal performance.39
 
 This 

















ABPerfi,t measures abnormal performance for firm i at time t using one of the 
three performance measures (ROS, GM, and ROSGA) discussed in the previous 
subsection. Prior period negative abnormal performance is captured by the interaction 
between abnormal performance and an indicator variable (NEGi,t-1) equal to 1 if the 
abnormal performance for firm i at time t-1 is less than zero and equal to 0 otherwise. 
Similarly, prior period positive abnormal performance is captured by the interaction 
between abnormal performance and indicator variable (POSi,t-1) equal to 1 if abnormal 
performance is greater than or equal to zero and 0 otherwise. Coefficients φ3 and φ4 
capture negative and positive abnormal performance persistence and are expected to be 
between 0 and 1 (Harris, 1998). The coefficients (φ1,i and φ2,i) on the indicator variables 
allow the intercepts to vary by each firm i to capture firm-specific heterogeneity in 
                                                 
39 It is possible that the same actions used to create a BTE cost advantage change the rate at which 
performance changes (perhaps reducing the persistence of negative performance) than without the change 
in strategy. In this case, the investment associated with the change in strategy must be more efficient 
(increase performance at a quicker rate) than existing investments. However, customer retention theory 





negative and positive abnormal performance.40
A disclosure indicator variable (DISCi,t) is added to identify changes in 
persistence of abnormal performance subsequent to disclosure. DISCi,t is equal to 0 for all 





























Coefficients (φ7 and φ8) on the interactions between abnormal performance 
(NEGi,t*ABPerfi,t and POSi,t*ABPerfi,t) and the disclosure indicator variable (DISCi,t) 
estimate the change in persistence subsequent to the disclosure year. The persistence of 
negative abnormal performance is not expected to change because competitors do not 
have an incentive to pursue negative abnormal performance (φ7=0). In contrast, a BTE is 
expected to increase the persistence of positive abnormal performance (φ8>0). 
Hypotheses 3.1 and 3.2 compare the change in persistence of positive abnormal 
performance for firms that provide verifiable detail with that of firms that do not 
(φ8,verifiable detail > φ8,nonverifiable detail) for change and ongoing firms, respectively.41
                                                 
40 The negative and positive indicator variable intercepts are interacted with firm indicator variables to 
capture firm-specific differences in negative and positive abnormal performance. 
 
Hypothesis 3.3 makes a similar comparison between the change firms and ongoing firms 
which provide verifiable detail (φ8,verifiable change firms > φ8,verifiable ongoing firms). 
41 The hypothesis tests are performed by using a stacked regression that combines subsamples, using 
verifiable detail indicator variable interactions to identify differences between the subsamples. For 




The coefficients (φ5 and φ6) on the interaction between the negative and positive 
performance indicator variables and the disclosure indicator variable allow the negative 
and positive intercepts to vary subsequent to disclosure. φ5 and φ6 cannot be interpreted as 
changes in the level of abnormal performance associated with disclosure without 
accounting for changes in persistence (φ7 and φ8). Section 3.5 provides additional 
analysis to compare changes in the level of abnormal performance between subsamples. 
Each regression uses panel data as described in Table 3.1. There is likely auto-
correlation within each panel that inflates standard errors.42 The parameter estimates are 
calculated using generalized least squares regression using the Prais-Winsten estimator 
(1954) to correct for panel-specific auto-regression (Vogelsang, 1998). Firm indicator 
variables are also included to account for fixed effects (Petersen, 2009).43
 
 
The empirical results identify a difference in the change in persistence of positive 
abnormal performance associated with the disclosure of customer retention strategy 
between firms that provide verifiable detail and firms that do not. Table 3.4 Panel A 
provides a summary of the regression results testing hypothesis 3.1, using change firms. 
Panel B provides results for hypothesis 3.2, using ongoing firms. Finally, Panel C 
provides results for hypothesis 3.3, comparing change and ongoing firms that provide 
verifiable detail. 
Primary Results 
Each trio of columns reports results using one of the three abnormal performance 
                                                 
42 The matched-pair design using firms within the same industry removes any cross-sectional correlation. 
43 The firm indicator variables are interacted with NEGi,t-1 and POSi,t-1 to capture firm-specific differences 
in negative and positive intercepts. 
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Table 3.4 
Persistence of Positive Abnormal Performance 

























DV = Abnormal ROS DV = Abnormal GM DV = Abnormal SGA Margin 
Verif Chg Non-verif. Sig of Diff Verif Chg Non-verif. Sig of Diff Verif Chg Non-verif. Sig of Diff 
  (Cred/ 
Non) 






































POSi,t-11 (φ2,i) (+ / +) (0)   0.066 
 (7.92)*** 




  0.050 
 (5.72)*** 
  0.076 
 (4.75)*** 
 
  (0.23) 
  0.050 
 (4.39)*** 






(φ3) (+ / +) (0)   0.209 
 (2.14)* 




  0.177 
 (1.29) 
  0.281 
 (1.83)‡ 
 
  (0.21) 
  0.337 
 (2.65)** 






(φ4) (+ / +) (0)   0.037 
 (0.19) 




  0.475 
 (3.41)*** 
  0.355 
 (2.48)* 
 
  (1.33) 
  0.295 
 (2.29)* 









  (0.01) 
  0.005 
 (0.57) 










DISCi,t-1  *POSi,t-1 (φ6) (? / 0) (?) –0.006 
(–0.67) 




  0.007 
 (0.44) 
  0.007 
 (0.83) 
 
  (0.73) 
–0.025 
(–3.46)*** 
  0.013 










  (2.02)* 











  (0.04) 
DISCi,t-1*POSi,t-1 
*ABPerfi,t-1 
(φ8) (+ / 0) (+)   0.331 
 (1.44) 
  0.016 
 (0.12) 
 
  (1.38) 
–0.156 
(–0.44) 









  (3.98)*** 
MktshrI,t-1 (φ9) (+ / +) (0) –0.033 
(–0.52) 
















Herfi,t-1 (φ10) (+ / +) (0) –0.136 
(–3.09)** 
















Industry Firmsi,t-1 (φ11) (– / –) (0)   0.000 
 (1.49) 















  (0.29) 





  (2.34)* 
  0.001 
  (0.15) 
  0.004 
 (0.53) 
 







Adj. R-Sq.    0.823 0.860  0.763 0.923  0.862 0.912  
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Table 3.4 (Continued) 

























DV = Abnormal ROS DV = Abnormal GM DV = Abnormal SGA Margin 
Verif Ong Non-verif. Sig of 
Diff 
Verif Ong Non-verif. Sig of 
Diff 
Verif Ong Non-verif. Sig of 
Diff 
  (Cred/ 
Non) 






































POSi,t-11 (φ2,I) (+ / +) (0)   0.093 
 (2.69)* 










  0.057 
 (7.05)*** 






(φ3) (+ / +) (0)   0.393 
 (3.45)*** 
  0.300 
 (2.55)* 
 
  (0.76) 
  0.201 
 (1.81)* 




  0.121 
 (1.28) 






(φ4) (+ / +) (0)   0.038 
 (0.23) 










  0.085 
 (0.73) 




DISCi,t-1 *NEGi,t-1 (φ5) (? / 0) (?) –0.004 
(–0.25) 










  0.013 
  (1.04) 




DISCi,t-1  *POSi,t-1 (φ6) (? / 0) (?)   0.024 
 (1.51) 
  0.003 
 (0.37) 
 
  (1.56) 
  0.032 
 (2.78)** 












(φ7) (? / 0) (?) –0.005 
(–0.02) 




  0.663 
 (7.28)*** 




  0.076 
 (0.24) 


















  0.541 
 (4.14)*** 









  (2.31)* 






























Industry Firmsi,t-1 (φ11) (– / –) (0)   0.000 
 (1.86)‡ 
  0.000 
 (0.60) 
 
  (2.56)** 
  0.000 
 (1.07) 






















  0.001 
 (0.26) 








Table 3.4 (Continued) 


























DV = Abnormal ROS DV = Abnormal GM DV = Abnormal SGA Margin 
Verif Chg Verif Ong Sig of 
Diff 
Verif Chg Verif Ong Sig of Diff Verif Chg Verif Ong Sig of Diff 
  (Cred/ 
Less) 





































  (3.63)*** 
POSi,t-11 (φ2,I) (+ / +) (0)   0.066 
 (7.92)*** 










  0.050 
 (4.39)*** 
  0.057 
 (7.05)*** 
 
  (3.52)*** 
NEGi,t-1 
*ABPerfi,t-1 
(φ3) (+ / +) (0)   0.209 
 (2.14)* 




  0.177 
 (1.29) 




  0.337 
 (2.65)** 
  0.121 
 (1.28) 
 
  (1.47) 
POSi,t-1 *ABPerfi,t-
1 
(φ4) (+ / +) (0)   0.037 
 (0.19) 










  0.295 
 (2.29)* 
  0.085 
 (0.73) 
 
  (0.92) 






  0.005 
 (0.57) 






  0.013 
  (1.04) 
 
 (–1.79)‡ 
DISCi,t-1  *POSi,t-1 (φ6) (? / ?) (?) –0.006 
(–0.67) 




  0.007 
 (0.44) 


















  0.110 
 (0.59) 
























  0.486 
 (3.49)*** 
  0.541 
  (4.14)*** 
 
  (0.07) 
MktshrI,t-1 (φ9) (+ / +) (0) –0.033 
(–0.52) 


































Industry Firmsi,t-1 (φ11) (– / –) (0)   0.000 
 (1.49) 






















  0.001 











Adj. R-Sq.    0.823 0.810  0.763 0.887  0.862 0.864  






Table 3.4 (Continued) 
All variables are defined in Table 3.3. 
All estimates use Paris-Winston regressions that correct standard errors for correlated panels and panel-specific auto-correlation. 
***, **, *, ‡ indicate statistical significance at p<0.001, p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.10 levels, respectively (2-tailed tests) 
Verifiable Detail and Nonverifiable Detail Change subsample sizes (N) are 141 and 185, respectively  
Verifiable Detail and Nonverifiable Detail Ongoing subsample sizes (N) are 118 and 321, respectively  











measures: ROS, GM, and SGA Margin. The combination of results provides insight into 
the sources of cost advantage that contribute to changes in positive abnormal persistence. 
As described previously, GM captures customer switching costs while SGA Margin 
captures both customer switching costs and transaction costs. Similarly, SGA Margin 
does not capture production/purchasing efficiencies while GM does. ROS captures the 
combined effects of all cost advantages on firm performance. Section 3.5 provides 
additional analysis to identify changes in the levels of performance within and between 
subsamples. Thus, no discussion regarding coefficients φ1,i, φ2,i, φ5, and φ6 is included in 
this section. 
 
Results Using Firms That Disclose a Change in Customer 
Retention Strategy 
 Table 3.4 Panel A provides regression results comparing firms that provide 
verifiable detail relating to a change in customer retention strategy with change firms that 
do not. Each trio of columns reports: 1) the regression results for change firms that 
provide verifiable detail, 2) results for firms that do not provide verifiable detail, and 3) 
the significance of the difference between the parameter estimates from the two 
subsamples. 
 Parameter φ8 captures changes in positive abnormal persistence subsequent to 
disclosure. The results using abnormal ROS and GM (first two sets of columns) do not 
reveal any significant changes in positive abnormal persistence nor any differences 
associated with the level of verifiable detail. However, results using SGA Margin (third 





performance (φ8=0.331 p<0.001) for firms that provide verifiable detail in their 
disclosure of a change in strategy. Further supporting hypothesis 3.1, the change in 
persistence for firms that provide verifiable detail is greater than that of firms that do not 
(p<0.001). The fact that these results only manifest themselves using SGA Margin is 
consistent with an increased customer transaction cost advantage as opposed to customer 
switching costs and/or production/purchasing efficiencies. 
 The parameter estimates on the control variables differ between subsamples and 
are not entirely consistent with expectations. For example, the parameter estimate on 
market share for the subsample of firms that provides verifiable detail indicates that 
market share is not associated with abnormal performance. This implies that, on average, 
market share is not an indicator of market power leading to abnormal performance. The 
parameter estimates on the Herfindahl industry concentration index are negative using 
ROS and SGA Margin. This implies that a high concentration of large (relative to small) 
firms within a market is not associated with imperfect competition and/or efficiency 
advantages, but is indicative of an environment that deteriorates abnormal performance. 
Finally, the parameter estimate on the number of firms within each industry is positive 
for the verifiable detail subsample. This implies that greater numbers of competitors are 
associated with higher abnormal performance. It is possible that this is representative of a 
market with many niche product opportunities. 
 In summary, the results using change firms are consistent with hypothesis 3.1, 
that verifiable detail is a valid source of credibility for firms that disclose a change in 





retention disclosure appears to be derived from customer transaction costs as opposed to 
customer switching costs. Finally, the verifiable detail subsample appears to be 
comprised on firms that reside in competitive environments where market share does not 
imply market power and industry concentration does not enable persistent abnormal 
profits. It is possible that this environment is conducive for credible disclosure of 
customer retention strategy because of its unique competitive characteristics. 
 
Results for Firms That Disclose an Ongoing Customer Retention 
Strategy 
 Table 3.4 Panel B provides regression results comparing firms that provide 
verifiable detail relating to an ongoing customer retention strategy with firms that do not. 
The persistence of SGA Margin (third set of columns) increases subsequent to disclosure 
(φ8=0.541 p<0.001) for firms that provide verifiable detail. Further, supporting 
hypothesis 3.2, the change in persistence for ongoing firms that provide verifiable detail 
is greater than that of firms that do not (p<0.01). 
 Predisclosure positive abnormal GM persistence (φ4) is negative, albeit 
insignificant (p=0.362). This implies that prior to disclosure, firms that disclose an 
ongoing customer retention strategy with verifiable detail are unable to retain positive 
abnormal gross margin, perhaps due to the use of low prices to retain customers. 
Additionally, the persistence of predisclosure positive abnormal SGA Margin (φ4) for 
firms that provide verifiable detail is marginally less than that of firms that do not provide 
it (p<0.10). These results indicate that firms in the verifiable detail subsample may be 






 Similar to analysis using change firms (previous subsection), the parameter 
estimates on the control variables differ between subsamples and are not completely 
consistent with expectations. For example, the nonverifiable subsample parameter 
estimates on market share are negative for all performance measures (p<0.10, p<0.001, 
p<0.01). This implies that market share does not represent market power. It is possible 
that high-market share firms in this subsample are pricing aggressively to preserve their 
share, resulting in poor abnormal performance relative to firms with lower market share. 
Additionally, the parameter estimates on the Herfindahl industry concentration index are 
negative (p<0.001, p<0.01, p<0.05) and the parameter estimates on the number of firms 
within the industry are positive using ROS and GM (p<0.10, p<0.05). This implies that 
market concentration is not associated with imperfect competition and/or efficiency 
advantages. It is indicative of an environment where large numbers of unconcentrated 
competitors lead to positive abnormal performance (perhaps due to niche product 
opportunities). 
 In summary, the results using ongoing firms are consistent with hypothesis 3.2, 
that verifiable detail is a valid source of credibility for firms that disclose an ongoing 
customer retention strategy. Further, the disclosure itself (disclosure effect) appears to 
contribute to the effectiveness of the BTE strategy by deterring competitors from entering 
the market. Finally, the ongoing firm subsamples appear to be comprised of firms that 
reside in unusual competitive environments where market share does not imply market 





subsamples have a similar competitive environment, yet only the verifiable detail 
subsample has a positive change in the persistence of abnormal performance. This 
provides confidence that the environment itself does not drive the results supporting 
hypothesis 3.2.  
 
Results From Comparing Firms That Disclose a Change in Customer 
Retention Strategy with Those that Disclose an Ongoing Customer 
Retention Strategy, Both of Which Provide Verifiable Detail 
 Table 3.4 Panel C provides regression results comparing firms that provide 
verifiable detail relating to a change in customer retention strategy with those that 
provide verifiable detail relating to an ongoing customer retention strategy. As mentioned 
in the previous two subsections, both verifiable subsamples (change and ongoing firms) 
show an increase in the persistence of positive abnormal SGA Margin (φ8=0.486, 0.541; 
p<0.001). These increases are not significantly different between the change and ongoing 
subsamples (p=0.947), indicating that both disclosures are equally credible with respect 
to SGA Margin. However, the change in positive abnormal ROS persistence is greater for 
the change firm subsample relative to the ongoing firm subsample (p<0.01). This result 
provides support for hypothesis 3.3, that the credibility of verifiable details associated 
with a change in customer retention strategy is inherently greater than the credibility of 
verifiable details relating to an ongoing customer retention strategy. 
 As mentioned in the previous subsection, firms in the change and ongoing 
subsamples fit a similar competitive profile. Specifically, market share is not positively 





subsample, p<0.05). The parameter estimates on the Herfindahl industry concentration 
index are generally negative (p<0.01, p<0.001, p<0.10) and the parameter estimates on 
the number of firms within the industry are positive for the ongoing firms using ROS 
(p<0.10) and for the change firms using SGA Margin (p<0.001). In contrast, the 
parameter estimate on the number of industry firms for the ongoing firm subsample using 
SGA margin is negative (p<0.10). This implies that market concentration does not lead to 
imperfect competition and/or efficiency advantages and greater numbers of competitors 
do not appear to erode abnormal performance. 
 In summary, the results from comparing change and ongoing firms that provide 
verifiable detail are consistent with hypothesis 3.3, that change firms that provide 
verifiable detail are associated with greater changes in positive abnormal persistence than 




 This paper performs two robustness tests to validate the primary results. First, it 
varies the pre- and postdisclosure time horizons to mitigate concerns about confounding 
effects within the sample period and to provide adequate time to capture postdisclosure 
performance trends. Second, it uses an alternative benchmark, 4-digit NAICS mean 








 The primary results use 4 years of predisclosure and 4 years of postdisclosure 
data. As discussed in section 3.3, this is done to provide an adequate number of firm-
years to establish pre- and postdisclosure performance trends, yet limits the potential 
influence of factors unrelated to customer retention strategy. In this section, three 
variations in timing are used to establish the robustness of the primary results. First, the 
pre- and postdisclosure periods are reduced to exactly 2 years (–2/+2 window). This is 
done to isolate immediate pre- and postdisclosure performance. Additionally, it 
eliminates any incremental weight placed on firms that have a full complement of firm-
year observations relative to those that do not. Second, the postdisclosure period is 
increased to 6 years (–4/+6 window). This is done to capture performance effects that 
take longer to materialize. The third variation uses all, up to 15 firm-years, available data 
(all firm-years) to capture long-term changes. 
Alternative Timing 
 Results (untabulated) support hypothesis 3.1 across all three timing iterations. 
Specifically, similar to the primary results discussed in section 3.4, the increase in 
persistence of positive abnormal SGA Margin for firms that provide verifiable detail 
exceeds that of firms that do not. In addition, the ROS performance measure also 
provides support for hypothesis 3.1. The change in positive abnormal ROS persistence 
for firms that provide verifiable detail exceeds that of firms that do not using the –4/+6 
window and the all firm-years timing variations. 





timing iterations. The results are similar to the primary results described in section 3.4 
(higher positive SGA Margin persistence for firms that provide verifiable detail). 
However, results using the all firm-years timing variation do not support hypothesis 3.2. 
It is possible that factors unrelated to customer retention disclosure confound the ongoing 
firm results as the sample window is expanded. 
 Finally, all but the –2/+2 window timing variation provide results that support 
hypothesis 3.3 (the change in positive abnormal persistence associated with change firms 
exceeds that of ongoing firms given disclosures that provide verifiable detail). This 
implies that the change in persistence for ongoing firms (disclosure effect) is 
concentrated in the years immediately surrounding the disclosure. 
 
 As discussed in section 3.3, the primary results measure abnormal performance 
using a matched-pair design. This section evaluates results using 4-digit NAICS industry 
mean-adjusted abnormal performance measures. An additional variable, the natural log of 
market value of equity, is added as a control variable to equation 3.2 to account for 
systematic size-related performance trends.
Alternative Benchmark – Industry Average Performance 
44
 Table 3.5 provides descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations. Panel A reveals 
that disclosing firms tend to have negative industry-adjusted ROS, decomposed into 
positive industry-adjusted GM more than offset by negative industry-adjusted SGA 
Margin. Panel B reveals that the nonverifiable change firm subsample ROS decreases 
 
                                                 
44 The matched-pair design did not need this control variable because it controlled for size-related 
performance trends by calculating abnormal performance using firms matched on firm size. 
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Table 3.5 
Descriptive Statistics for Performance Variables Using 4-digit NAICS Mean as a Benchmark 
Panel A – Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Samples # Firms Mean Median 1st Quartile 3rd Quartile Std Deviation 
Performance Variables 
Abnormal Return on 
Sales 
Total Sample 98 (2.0%) (1.2%)   (4.9%)  2.2% 12 points 
       
Subsamples:       
Verifiable Change 18 (1.6%)  0.4%   (1.9%)  2.5% 13 points 
Nonverifiable Change 23  0.5% (0.8%)   (4.5%)  5.9%   7 points 
Verifiable Ongoing 15 (1.4%) (3.2%)   (5.6%) (1.0%) 18 points 
Nonverifiable Ongoing 42 (3.7%) (1.8%)   (7.8%)  0.9% 11 points 
Abnormal Gross 
Margin 
Total Sample 98  4.1%  1.6%   (4.4%) 10.0% 16 points 
       
Subsamples:       
Verifiable Change 18  2.6%  3.4%   (2.5%)   7.1% 15 points 
Nonverifiable Change 23  4.1%  2.4%   (1.9%)   8.4%   9 points 
Verifiable Ongoing 15  6.5% (2.1%)   (4.8%) 10.8% 25 points 





Total Sample 98 (6.1%) (2.6%) (11.1%)   1.9% 13 points 
       
Subsamples:       
Verifiable Change 18 (4.2%) (2.1%) (10.1%)   3.3% 13 points 
Nonverifiable Change 23 (3.6%) (2.0%)   (8.8%)   1.1%   7 points 
Verifiable Ongoing 15 (7.9%) (2.6%) (11.1%)   2.4% 20 points 
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Table 3.5 (Continued) 
Panel B – Mean Values by Year 






1 yr prior Disclosure 
Year 
1 yr after 2 yrs after 3 yrs after 4 yrs after 
Performance Variables 
# of Firms Total Sample 81 91 98 98 98 98 98 81 66 
          
Subsamples:          
Verifiable Change 14 15 18 18 18 18 18 15 14 
Nonverifiable Change 19 20 23 23 23 23 23 22 17 
Verifiable Ongoing 13 15 15 15 15 15 15 12 10 
Nonverifiable Ongoing 35 41 42 42 42 42 42 32 18 
Mean Abnormal 
Return on Sales 
Total Sample  0.8% (1.9%) (1.7%) (0.1%) (1.1%) (2.6%)‡ (3.8%)* (2.5%)‡ (3.6%)‡ 
          
Subsamples:          
Verifiable Change  3.9%* (0.8%) (1.6%) (1.6%) (2.0%) (0.7%) (1.3%) (2.5%) (4.0%) 
Nonverifiable Change  3.9%*  4.4%*  1.3%  1.1%  1.0% (1.8%) (1.2%) (1.3%) (4.3%) 
Verifiable Ongoing  3.8% (10.1%) (2.9%) (0.8%) (0.5%) (0.0%)  0.1%  0.7%  2.1% 
Nonverifiable Ongoing (3.2%)‡ (2.4%) (3.0%)  0.2% (2.1%) (4.7%)* (7.7%)* (4.6%)* (5.3%)‡ 
Mean Abnormal 
Gross Margin 
Total Sample  3.8%‡  4.4%*  4.2%*  4.8%**  3.8%*  4.0%*  4.0%*  3.9%*  2.8% 
          
Subsamples:          
Verifiable Change  7.2%‡  5.5%  2.6%  2.1%  2.4%  3.2%  2.7%  0.2% (2.3%) 
Nonverifiable Change  2.4%  4.0%‡  1.4%  2.9%  3.7%  4.5%*  5.6%*  6.9%*  4.1% 
Verifiable Ongoing  9.6%  6.0%  7.1%  6.8%  6.5%  6.6%  5.7%  6.2% 10.0% 





Total Sample (2.9%)‡ (6.3%)* (5.9%)**
* 
(4.9%)** (4.9%)*** (6.5%)*** (7.8%)*** (6.4%)*** (6.4%)*** 
          
Subsamples:          
Verifiable Change (3.3%) (6.3%) (4.2%) (3.7%) (4.4%) (3.9%) (3.9%) (2.7%) (1.7%) 
Nonverifiable Change  1.5%  0.4% (0.1%) (1.7%) (2.7%)‡ (6.3%)** (6.8%)** (8.2%)** (8.3%)* 
Verifiable Ongoing (5.8%) (16.1%) (10.0%) (7.6%) (7.0%) (6.6%) (5.6%) (5.6%) (7.8%) 
Nonverifiable Ongoing (4.1%) (6.1%)* (8.3%)** (6.1%)* (5.5%)* (7.8%)** (10.9%)** (7.3%)** (7.1%)** 
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Table 3.5 (Continued) 
Panel C – Pearson (Spearman) correlation on the upper (lower) diagonal 
N=809 ROS GM SGA Margin Market Share Herfindahl 
Index 






Abnormal Return on Sales (ROS)    0.474 
  *** 
  0.214 
  *** 
  0.086 
  * 
–0.074 
  * 
  0.017 –0.027   0.247 
  *** 
Abnormal Gross Margin (GM)   0.457 
  *** 
 –0.664 
  *** 
–0.268 
  *** 
–0.163 
  *** 
  0.204 
  *** 
–0.052 –0.024 
Abnormal Selling, General, and 
Administrative Margin (SGA Margin) 
  0.414 
  *** 
–0.620 
  *** 
   0.347 
  *** 
  0.086 
  * 
–0.172 
  *** 
  0.024   0.193 
  *** 
Market Share   0.052 
   
–0.132 
  *** 
  0.181 
  *** 
   0.633 
  *** 
–0.799 
  *** 
  0.405 
  *** 
  0.488 
  *** 
Herfindahl Index –0.001   0.050 –0.052   0.487 
  *** 
 –0.804 
  *** 
  0.328 
  *** 
  0.001 
# of Firms in Industry   0.057   0.150 –0.104 
  ** 
–0.348 
  *** 
–0.581 
  *** 
 –0.351 
  *** 
–0.045 
  
Acquisition Indicator Variable –0.024 –0.045   0.025 
  
  0.334 
  *** 
  0.254 
  *** 
–0.308 
  *** 
   0.231 
  *** 
Market Value of Equity   0.147 
  *** 
–0.021 
  
  0.151 
  *** 
  0.227 




  ‡ 
  0.234 
  *** 
 
Variable Definitions (Calculations using Compustat data items in brackets): 
Abnormal Return on Sales Return on Sales [ebit/revt] adjusted by the 4-digit NAICS industry [naics] mean performance by firm-year. 
Abnormal Gross Margin Gross Margin [1 – cogs/revt] adjusted by the 4-digit NAICS industry [naics] mean performance by firm-year. 
Abnormal Selling, General, and 
Administrative Margin 
Selling, General, and Administrative Margin [(ebit + cogs)/revt] adjusted by the 4-digit NAICS industry [naics] mean 
performance by firm-year. 
Market Share As defined in Table 3.3. 
Herfindahl Concentration Index As defined in Table 3.3. 
Number of Firms in NAICS4 Industry As defined in Table 3.3. 
Acquisition Indicator Variable As defined in Table 3.3. 
Market Value The natural log of market value [mvalt] at the end of the fiscal period. 




subsequent to disclosure and the verifiable ongoing firm subsample industry-adjusted 
ROS increases monotonically (with the exception of the 1st year). This provides support 
for the credibility of ongoing firms that provide verifiable detail and lack of credibility 
for change firms that do not. The other subsamples do not appear to have consistent 
performance trends. Bi-variate correlations reported in Panel C are generally consistent 
with those using the matched pair design (Table 3.3 Panel C). 
 Regression results (untabulated) reveal that hypothesis 3.1 is not supported using 
industry-adjusted performance measures. In fact, the change in positive abnormal ROS 
persistence is less for firms that provide verifiable detail than those that do not (p<0.10), 
providing support against hypothesis 3.1. In contrast, results support hypothesis 3.2 by 
reporting a greater change (p<0.05) in the persistence of positive abnormal ROS for 
ongoing firms that provide verifiable detail than ongoing firms that do not. Finally, 
results contradict hypothesis 3.3 by finding that change firms that provide verifiable 
detail have a smaller change in positive abnormal ROS than ongoing firms that provide 
verifiable detail. 
 It is possible that these contradictory results are due to over-weighting 
observations that have a full 9 years of available data relative to firms that do not. To 
illustrate, Table 3.5 Panel A shows that change firms that provide verifiable detail have 
significantly positive performance in the 1st year of the sample (4 years prior to 
disclosure), yet only 14 of the 18 firms are represented in that time period. Further 
analysis (untabulated) addresses this concern by applying the limited sample period (–2/ 





performance measures. Results using a –2/+2 window sample period support hypothesis 
3.1 by reporting an increase in the persistence of abnormal GM for firms that provide 
verifiable detail relative to those that do not. 
 In summary, analysis using industry-adjusted performance as a proxy for 
abnormal performance supports the conclusion that verifiable detail provides credibility 
to customer retention strategy disclosure, particularly when the sample period is limited 
to a –2/+2 window in which all firms have the same number of observations. 
 
Additional Analysis – Changes in the Levels of Abnormal 
Performance 
 Dickinson and Sommers (2008) document that BTE variables are positively 
associated with the level of future performance. This section uses increases in the level of 
future performance associated with disclosure as an alternative proxy for the validity of 
verifiable detail as a source of credibility. Firms that provide verifiable detail are 
expected to have greater changes in the level of abnormal performance than firms that do 
not. As explained in section 3.3, it is difficult to infer changes in the level of abnormal 
performance from the regression coefficients estimated using equation 3.2. This 
subsection provides an alternative form of analysis by comparing average pre- and 
postdisclosure levels of abnormal performance. 
 Table 3.6 provides average pre- and postdisclosure levels of abnormal 
performance. Each measure (ROS, GM and SGA Margin) is represented by a trio of 
columns. The third column for each measure reports the change in the level of 
performance from pre- to postdisclosure time periods. The first two rows report 




Analysis of Pre- and Postdisclosure Levels of Abnormal Performance 
Mean Abnormal ROS Abnormal GM Abnormal SGA Margin 
Subsamples: Pre- Post- Change Pre- Post- Change Pre- Post- Change 
Verifiable Change (1.0%)  0.6%  1.5%  0.2% 0.4%  0.2% (1.2%)  0.2%  1.4% 
Nonverifiable Change  1.0% (1.0%) (2.0%) (0.1%) 2.6%  2.7%  1.1% (3.6%) (4.7%)* 
  Difference    3.5%   (2.6%)    6.1%* 
          
Subsamples: Pre- Post- Change Pre- Post- Change Pre- Post- Change 
Verifiable Ongoing (1.5%) (0.2%)  1.3% (0.6%) (1.0%) (0.3%) (0.9%)  0.7%  1.6% 
Nonverifiable Ongoing  1.2% (2.7%) (3.9%)‡  2.3%  1.2% (1.1%) (1.1%) (3.9%) (2.8%) 
  Difference    5.2%    0.8%    4.4% 
Predisclosure period includes up to 4 years prior to and including the disclosure year. 
Postdisclosure period includes up to 4 years subsequent to the disclosure year. 
Pre- and Postdisclosure abnormal performance measures are first averaged by firm and then averaged across subsamples to avoid 
biasing estimates towards firms that have 9 years of observations. 
Statistical significance between groups calculated using group mean t-tests. Statistical significance within groups calculated using an 
expected value of zero. 







performance for change firms that provide verifiable detail and change firms that do not. 
The second pair of rows reports performance for ongoing firms similarly separated by the 
presence of verifiable detail. The third row of each section reports differences in changes 
between verifiable detail and nonverifiable detail subsamples. 
 Change firms that provide verifiable detail increase the level of performance 
across all three performance measures. Although consistent across measures, the changes 
do not statistically differ from zero. In contrast, change firms that do not provide 
verifiable detail decrease SGA Margin performance at a statistically significant level 
(p<0.05). Finally, the change in SGA Margin for change firms that provide verifiable 
detail is statistically greater than the change in SGA Margin for firms that do not 
(p<0.05). 
 Ongoing firms that provide verifiable detail increase the level of performance 
using ROS and SGA Margin and show a small decrease using GM. However, the changes 
do not statistically differ from zero. In contrast, ongoing firms that do not provide 
verifiable detail decrease ROS at a statistically significant level (p<0.10) and report 
insignificant decreases in GM and SGA Margin. Finally, the change in the level of 
performance across all three performance measures is consistently greater for ongoing 
firms that provide verifiable detail than the change for ongoing firms that do not. 
However, the difference is not statistically significant using any single performance 
measure. In summary, the evidence using changes in the level of abnormal performance 






 This paper uses variation in the presence of verifiable detail provided in customer 
retention strategy disclosures to validate the credibility of nonfinancial disclosures. 
Specifically, it finds that firms that provide verifiable detail have a greater change in the 
persistence of positive abnormal performance than firms that do not. This contributes to 
the voluntary disclosure literature by providing evidence that verifiable detail is a source 
of credibility to nonfinancial disclosure, using a setting where credibility can be 
measured by theory-supported realizations of future performance. 
Conclusion 
 These results should be of value to accounting researchers and market participants 
interested in the credibility of voluntary disclosure. The results of this study suggest that 
credibility through ex post verification is not limited to accounting measures reported on 
audited financial statements. Detailed nonfinancial statements that relate to observable 
strategy can also provide credibility. 
 This study has a significant limitation in that it uses a single disclosure setting to 
evaluate the credibility of nonfinancial disclosure through the use of verifiable detail. The 
usefulness and availability of verifiable detail may vary substantially across nonfinancial 
disclosure settings. For example, firms may disclose employee retention programs that 
create a barrier to entry (potential competitors must incur employee development costs to 
enter a market). However, disclosed implementation details may be more difficult to 
verify than those relating to customer retention programs. In contrast, a firm may disclose 
strategic partnerships. However, the disclosure may not provide any information because 





nonfinancial disclosure settings provides a vast landscape for future research. 
 
 The following examples are actual customer retention disclosures included in 10-
K filings from each subsample: 
Appendix 
 
Verifiable Change Firms 
Apple Inc. provides the following reference to customer retention strategy in its 
fiscal year 2004 10-K filing: 
The Company believes a high quality buying experience with knowledgeable 
salespersons… is critical to attracting and retaining customers. As such, … the 
Company has expected its product distribution strategy to include… the Apple 
Sales Consultant Program. 
This is coded as a change in customer retention strategy with a high level of verifiable 
detail. The Apple Sales Consultant program can be verified by parties external to the 
firm. 
Popular, Inc. provides the following reference to customer retention strategy in its 
fiscal year 2002 10-K filing: 
In April 2002, BPPR launched the new PREMIA rewards program. This is a 
unique customer-loyalty program designed to compensate its customers for their 
banking relationships. The program allows customers of BPPR and of the 
Corporation’s subsidiaries in Puerto Rico to enroll and accumulate points for 
everyday financial transactions and from a variety of products and services, 
including deposit accounts, credit cards, mortgage and auto loans, and electronic 
services transactions, among others. The points accumulated are redeemable for 
airline tickets, merchandise and prepaid ATM cards, among other alternatives. 
This is coded a change in customer retention strategy with a high level of verifiable 





Gannett Co., Inc. provides the following reference to an acquisition designed to 
enhance customer retention in its fiscal year 2003 10-K filing: 
On Oct. 31, 2003, the company acquired the assets of Clipper Magazine, Inc., one 
of the nation’s largest direct-mail advertising magazine companies. The 
acquisition also includes several affiliated operations including a full-service 
advertising agency, an e-mail customer retention service, a direct-mail service to 
new movers and MyClipper.com, a companion Web site for the core direct-mail 
advertising offerings. 
This disclosure is coded a change in customer retention strategy with a high level of 
verifiable detail. The reference describes an acquisition that can be easily verified. 
CVS Caremark Corporation provides the following reference to customer 
retention strategy in its fiscal year 2000 10-K filing. Note that this disclosure references 
customer retention in the context of a broader barrier to entry strategy including business 
partner and employee relationships: 
We are currently beginning the chain wide rollout of our new relationship 
marketing program, the ExtraCare Card. Through the ExtraCare card, we will 
offer special promotions and incentives to our best customers to reward their 
patronage and encourage increased loyalty. 
This is coded a change in customer retention strategy with a high level of verifiable 
detail. The ExtraCare card can be easily verified by parties external to the firm. 
 
Nonverifiable Change Firms 
Banta Corp. provides the following reference to customer retention strategy in its 
fiscal year 2001 10-K filing: 
Through a targeted sales effort to maintain a high customer retention rate, Banta 






This is coded a change in customer retention strategy with a low level of verifiable detail. 
There is no implementation detail provided. 
Countrywide Financial Corporation provides the following reference to customer 
retention strategy in its fiscal year 2002 10-K filing. Note that this disclosure references 
customer retention in the context of a broader barrier to entry strategy including business 
partner and employee relationships: 
The Company’s relationship management initiative utilizes a combination of 
internally developed tools, together with Microsoft and Siebel web-based tools, to 
create a platform for managing all relationships. The Company’s goal is to 
provide customers, business partners and employees with online access to all of 
the available tools, resources and information they need through a web portal 
[countrywide.com, CWInsider.com, Sales Force Automation]. 
This is coded a change in customer retention strategy with a low level of verifiable detail. 
The strategy references web portal relationships with suppliers and customers, which are 
difficult to verify unless you are a supplier or customer. 
US Bancorp provides the following reference to customer retention strategy in its 
fiscal year 2004 10-K filing: 
The [decrease in business-related noninterest-bearing deposits] also included 
certain product changes to migrate high-value customers with balances of $1.3 
billion to the Company’s Silver Elite interest checking product to further enhance 
customer retention. 
This is coded a change in customer retention strategy with a low level of verifiable detail. 
The strategy references the migration of high-value customers to interest-bearing 
accounts, which are difficult to verify unless you are a high-value customer. 
Leucadia National Corporation provides the following reference to customer 





During 2004, Symphony performed an evaluation of its customer base, in order to 
identify those customer and markets where Symphony can deliver the highest 
level of service and that should be the focus of customer retention efforts, as well 
as identifying those customers that should be terminated. In addition, Symphony 
has restructured its corporate management and field operations organization, 
resulting in a more efficient organization with reduced costs. Symphony is also 
seeking to grow its profitable businesses, which includes expanding its service 
offerings to existing customers. 
This is coded a change in customer retention strategy with a low level of verifiable detail. 
The strategy references a push to identify and serve profitable customers, which is 
difficult to verify by parties external to the firm. 
 
Verifiable Ongoing Firms 
Citigroup Inc. provides the following reference to maintaining focus on increasing 
customer retention in its fiscal year 2001 10-K filing: 
[In 2001], Citibanking invested in programs and staff to improve operations and 
customer service while continuing to control overall expenses. In addition, 
Citibank continues to emphasize its needs-based sales approach through Citipro, a 
complimentary financial analysis that assess customers’ needs and recommends 
appropriate financial products to meet those needs. The key elements to grow our 
earnings will be increasing sales productivity in the Financial Centers; increasing 
customer retention through focused marketing, cross selling and technology; 
streamlining processes and investing in appropriate technology to improve 
productivity and cost efficiency, which, in turn, will enhance price 
flexibility; and improving customer service and satisfaction. 
This is coded an ongoing customer retention strategy with a high level of verifiable 
detail. The reference describes ‘Citipro,’ a program to “assess customers’ needs” that can 
be verified by parties external to the firm. 
Hughes Supply, Inc. provides the following reference to customer retention 





The key elements of our strategy are to: … buy, operate and sell as one integrated, 
streamlined organization. Specific actions taken or to be taken include the 
following: … The continued execution of best-in-class marketing programs, 
targeting both customers and vendors, which are designed to build on the Hughes 
brand name, to increase incremental revenues, improve customer retention and 
enhance business relationships across the supply chain. 
Our marketing programs build Hughes brand awareness and bring value to the 
supply chain by helping our vendors market and sell their products to a broad 
customer base. We are continuing to execute our best-in-class marketing 
programs, and we believe the following marketing materials and programs are 
unparalleled in our industry and differentiate us from our competitors: The 
creation of best-in-class promotional product brochures that provide our sales 
force with the tools they need to increase sales, while providing our vendors with 
an opportunity to participate in our comprehensive targeted sales program; The 
production of comprehensive product line catalogs with color photos that 
showcase vendors’ products and facilitate routine ordering for customers; 
Unrivaled customer awards programs that drive incremental sales and build 
customer loyalty; and The hosting of themed marketing events throughout our 
major markets attended by thousands of our customers, which provides us with 
the opportunity to show customer appreciation while allowing our vendors to 
showcase their quality products. 
This disclosure is coded an ongoing customer retention strategy with a high level of 
verifiable detail. The reference describes specific marketing programs (product 
brochures, catalogs, customer awards programs, themed marketing events) that can be 
observed by parties external to the firm. 
The Midland Company provides the following reference to customer retention 
strategy in its fiscal year 2003 10-K filing: 
Attracting good customers and keeping them for the long haul is critical. Product, 
price, service and convenience all play crucial roles in customer retention and 
conversion. Through American Modern, we’ve leveraged all four to achieve high 
customer retention rates for a specialty lines insurer. Our strong customer 
relationships are the result of our ability to provide a distinctive mix of 
exceptional service, competitive pricing and specialized products that customers 





This disclosure is coded an ongoing customer retention strategy with a high level of 
verifiable detail. The disclosure references product mix and pricing relative to 
competitors, which can be verified by parties external to the firm. 
KB Home provides the following reference to customer retention strategy in its 
fiscal year 2003 10-K filing: 
Our division personnel provide assistance to homebuyers during all phases of the 
homebuying process and after the home is sold. The coordinated efforts of sales 
representatives, KB Home Studio consultants, on-site construction 
superintendents and postclosing customer service personnel in the customer’s 
homebuying experience is intended to provide high levels of customer satisfaction 
and lead to enhanced customer retention and referrals. In our domestic 
homebuilding operations, we provide customers with a limited home warranty 
program administered by personnel in each of our divisions. This arrangement is 
designed to give our customers prompt and efficient postdelivery service directly 
from KB Home. 
This disclosure is coded an ongoing customer retention strategy with a high level of 
verifiable detail. The ‘limited home warranty’ program is easily verified by parties 
external to the firm. 
 
Nonverifiable Ongoing Firms 
American Medical Alert Corp. provides the following reference to customer 
retention strategy in its fiscal year 2006 10-K filing: 
While the Company generates organic growth in each reporting segment, 
customer retention is equally important. The Company’s customer service, 
provider relations and accounts services team focuses on account management 
and business development from existing customers. 
This disclosure is coded an ongoing customer retention strategy with a low level of 





be verified by parties external to the firm. 
AmSouth Bancorporation provides the following reference to customer retention 
strategy in its fiscal year 2003 10-K filing: 
The new strategic initiatives are similar to the initiatives AmSouth has 
emphasized since 2000. They include: … Enhance sales productivity, service 
quality and customer retention. 
This disclosure is coded an ongoing customer retention strategy with a low level of 
verifiable detail. There are no implementation details to verify. 
Ball Corporation provides the following reference to long-term customer 
relationships in its fiscal year 2004 10-K filing: 
We sell our packaging products primarily to major beverage and food producers 
with which we have developed long-term customer relationships. This is 
evidenced by our high customer retention and our large number of long-term 
supply contracts. 
This is coded an ongoing customer retention strategy with a low level of verifiable detail. 
The reference implies that there has been an effort to “develop long-term customer 
relationships.” However, ‘high’ customer retention and a ‘large number’ of long-term 
supply contracts cannot be easily verified by parties external to the firm. 
Ceridian Corporation provides the following reference to customer retention in its 
fiscal year 2003 10-K filing: 
Customer retention is an important factor in the amount and predictability of 
revenue and profits in our HRS businesses. In providing some of our services, 
particularly payroll processing and tax filing services, we incur installation and 
conversion costs in connection with new customers that need to be recovered 
before the contractual relationships will provide incremental profit. The length of 
time it takes for a contract to become profitable depends on a number of factors 
such as the number of employees covered by the contract, the complexity of the 





number of locations in which the customer’s employees are located. The longer 
we are able to retain a customer, the more profitable the contract will likely be. 
We have ongoing and continued initiatives to invest in and improve the 
performance of our U.S. HRS business. These initiatives include: … improving 
our customer service model, improving customer retention… 
The most significant source of customer leads for these [HRS] transaction-based 
products and services are referrals from these marketing relationships and existing 
customers, and other direct marketing efforts, such as telemarketing, direct mail 
and trade shows…. We are also seeking to further integrate and coordinate the 
sales and marketing efforts of our businesses and to sell a greater 
variety of our products and services to the customers of our various businesses. 
This disclosure emphasizes the importance of customer retention in creating profit. 
However, it is coded an ongoing customer retention strategy with a low level of verifiable 
detail. The reference describes “ongoing and continued initiatives” relating to customer 
retention. The only detail provided relates to coordination between businesses to enhance 
cross-selling opportunities. 
 
Abarbanell, J., & Bushee, B. 1997. Fundamental analysis, future earnings, and stock 
prices. Journal of Accounting Research 35, 1-24. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 My dissertation is comprised of three independent papers. The first paper 
(Chapter 1) is co-authored with Taylor Randall and Christian Terwiesch. In it, we 
examine the predictive associations between operations based variables and future 
earnings using data from the United States Air Transportation industry. We find that 
some operations based variables contain incremental predictive information beyond that 
provided by earnings components. Additionally, we find that the operations based 
variables that convey predictive information are different before and after the September 
11, 2001 terroristic attacks. Finally, we find that financial analysts do not fully impound 
the information provided by operations based variables after the terroristic attacks. 
 The second paper (Chapter 2) also uses United States Air Transportation industry 
data. In it, I provide evidence that sticky costs are associated with increasing marginal 
cost and decreasing marginal benefit as management adjusts capacity levels. I also find 
that sticky costs are associated with changing output selling prices, consistent with 
management using price changes to adjust sales volume to match capacity. These 
determinants add to the explanation offered by the extant literature that sticky costs arise 




 The third paper (Chapter 3) establishes the validity of verifiable detail as a source 
of credibility in nonfinancial strategy disclosure. I form expectations regarding outcome 
associated with credible nonfinancial strategy disclosure using customer retention theory. 
I then test whether customer retention strategy disclosures containing verifiable detail are 
associated with ex post outcome consistent with theory. I find that ex post outcome of 
firms that provide verifiable detail in their disclosures is more consistent with theory than 
outcome of firms that do not. This empirical evidence supports verifiable detail as a valid 
source of credibility in customer retention strategy disclosure. 
 
